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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND STATEMENTS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT
ROBERT P. MOSTELLERt
Two distinct rationales ensure the trustworthiness of hearsay evi-
dence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), which excepts
statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. First, a
patient has a selfish interest in providing truthful information in order to
obtain treatment. Second, a statement is reliable if a medical expert
uses it to form a basis for diagnosis or treatment. Professor Mosteller
examines how courts have analyzed and applied rule 803(4) in child
sexual abuse cases, and concludes that their confusion of the two ratio-
nales has resulted in decisions which are theoretically, as well as consti-
tutionally, infirm. He then offers guidance as to when and how rule
803(4) can be applied to achieve more accurate results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Statements made to a physician for the purpose of receiving medical treat-
ment have long been received under an exception to the rule that excludes hear-
say. The theory of the exception in its archetypal form is straightforward: a
patient's selfish interest in receiving appropriate treatment guarantees the trust-
worthiness of the statement. In this archetypal form, the exception is among the
most solidly founded within the hearsay rules.
In the last decade, two unrelated developments have undermined the coher-
ence of the exception. First, rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' the
modem embodiment of this exception,2 expanded the range of statements admis-
t Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1970, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; J.D. 1975, Yale University; M.P.P. 1975, Harvard University. I would like to thank Katharine
Bartlett, Sara Sun Beale, Elizabeth Gibson, and David Kaye for their valuable comments on an
earlier draft of this Article and Darius K. Amjadi for his assistance with the research.
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT. State-
ments for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
2. The federal rule has provided the model for the definition of this exception in the majority
of American jurisdictions. Twenty-five states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) and the military courts adopted federal rule 803(4) verbatim or with only
a minor stylistic variation. Seven states (Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Oklahoma, New Hampshire,
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sible to include statements made for the exclusive purpose of diagnosis when the
declarant has no belief that she will receive treatment. Second, the exception has
found increased use in an enormously expanding volume of prosecutions for
child sexual abuse.3 In these cases the exception has been applied to statements
involving medical and psychological diagnosis or treatment that often include a
large quantity of "social" data, encompassing the historical details of the crime
and the identity of the perpetrator. Also, the exception has been applied to
statements made to a growing range of professionals in medical, psychological,
and social work fields.
The exception has not weathered these developments particularly well.
While it has served as a useful vehicle for the admission of declarations by vic-
tims in child sexual abuse prosecutions, its application has in many instances
lost touch with the theories of trustworthiness that underlie the exception. Ap-
plications in this highly charged field 4 have tended to expose the thinness of the
justification for extending the exception to statements made without any view
toward treatment. The result has been to render the exception too broad in
some situations. On the other hand, judicial reaction to what some have viewed
as excessive expansion has threatened to restrict the exception in situations
where a liberal application would be justified.
Rhode Island, and Vermont) and Puerto Rico adopted a modified version of the federal rule lan-
guage. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(4)[02], [03] (1987 & 1988
Supp.). Some of the modifications were minor; other states, such as Rhode Island, made major
changes by excluding statements made to a physician consulted solely for trial preparation. Id, at
254 (1988 Supp.).
3. A growing body of literature has analyzed the application of hearsay exceptions in child
abuse and sexual abuse cases. See, eg., J. MYERS, CHILD WrrNEss LAW & PRACTICE (1987); J.
SELKIN & P. SCHOUTEN, THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM (1987); R. UN-
DERWAGER & H. WAKEFIELD, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988); CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE LAW Q. Bulkley 2d ed. 1982); SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND
VIsrrATON CASES (E. Nicholson & J. Bulkley ed. 1988); Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim,
The Rules of Evidence, and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14
AM. J. CraM. L. 227 (1988); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerg-
ing Issues in Child SexualAbuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985) [hereinafter Graham,
Indicia of Reliability]; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual
Abus" The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter Graham]; McCord,
Expert Psychological Testimony about Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray
into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CaIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986);
Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. Ray. 775 (1986); Comment,
Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J. 257 (1974); Note, A Com-
prehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745
(1983); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innova-
tions, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1985).
4. The courts are often very candid in their result orientation. In Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d
721 (Wyo. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984), the court admitted hearsay statements against
the defendant in a child abuse prosecution. In doing so, it acknowledged,
If the goal of our court were simply to pursue the common-law tradition of stare decisis,
then the cited authorities must be recognized as supporting the position of the appellant (to
exclude the statement]. In this instance, however, the function of the court must be to
pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which afflicts
our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse.
Id. at 725. See also Note, Evidence-Hearsay-Child Abuse and Neglect-A Child's Statements
Naming an Abuser Are Admissible Under the Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception to the Hear-
say Rule--Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 1155 (1984) (applauding
the court's use of this hearsay exception to help meet the social problem of child abuse).
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The hearsay exception under federal rule 803(4) is based on two distinct
rationales: the traditional theory, noted above, which this Article will term the
selfish treatment interest, 5 and a new theory, which admits statements that a
medical expert uses to form a basis for diagnosis or treatment. These two differ-
ent rationales should logically produce an exception with different dimensions.
However, most courts have made the fundamental mistake of treating the excep-
tion as if it covered hearsay statements within its bounds uniformly, regardless
of which of the two underlying rationales supports admission. As a conse-
quence, courts have made several types of errors. Some courts have included
within the exception statements made for the exclusive purpose of diagnosis,
without any anticipated treatment, just as freely as statements made for treat-
ment purposes. Another group of courts has suggested that, before a statement
may be received under the exception, both of the exception's rationales must be
satisfied. Finally, courts have failed to recognize that the confrontation clause
prohibits application of an expanded rule 803(4) in some criminal cases.
Part II of the Article develops the two theories of trustworthiness contained
within rule 803(4) and explores their implications for a number of issues that
arise in applying the exception in child sexual abuse cases. In Part III, the Arti-
cle examines the tortured analysis that has resulted from the failure of courts to
appreciate the significance of the separate rationales undergirding the exception.
Part IV develops the restrictions that the confrontation clause should impose on
the introduction of statements under rule 803(4) in criminal cases in which the
declarant does not testify. Finally, in Part V, the Article proposes an analysis
that explicitly recognizes the differences in theories underlying the rule and per-
mits broader admissibility in civil cases and those criminal cases where the con-
frontation clause is not applicable. In such cases, statements that are admitted
exclusively because they form a basis of the medical expert's opinion would gen-
erally be admissible, but even here the analysis would exclude some statements
concerning psychological and social information. Several factors would be rele-
vant to admissibility: the subject of the opinion to be rendered and whether the
opinion itself is admissible, the expertise of the expert receiving the statement,
the possible relationship to treatment, and the circumstances under which the
statement was made.
II. THE BASIC RATIONALE OF THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR
STATEMENTS MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS
OR TREATMENT
The hearsay exception for statements made to a medical doctor for the pur-
pose of treatment has a long history under the common law. 6 As with most
5. The term selfish treatment interest is used because the declarant may also have a selfish
interest that would discourage him or her from giving accurate statements of physical or mental
condition. In that situation, the declarant's selfish interest undermines, rather than supports, the
trustworthiness of the statement. For example, when speaking to a medical expert engaged in pre-
paring trial testimony, the declarant's interest may be in providing exaggerated or entirely false
information about the seriousness of the condition so as to enhance the size of the recovery at trial.
6. Statements of presently existing bodily condition were universally received as a hearsay
1989]
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hearsay exceptions, admission of the class of statements is based on a combina-
tion of two elements-trustworthiness and necessity. 7 Trustworthiness is the
more important factor for statements under this exception.8 Such trustworthi-
ness traditionally is based on the presumed interest of the declarant in making
truthful and accurate statements to her doctor to facilitate appropriate
treatment.9
The Federal Rules of Evidence worked a number of changes in the scope
and application of the traditional hearsay exception for a patient's statement to
her doctor. Two changes are of particular note. First, the rule admits state-
ments made to a doctor consulted only for the purpose of diagnosis, when no
treatment is anticipated by the declarant. The archetypal statement involved
here is one made to a physician who is consulted for the purpose of the doctor
giving expert testimony at trial. Second, the rule admits statements of general
causation of the condition or injury. 1°
exception. Statements relating medical history were received in some jurisdictions. See MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 292 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). See also 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1719 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (statements to a physician may be admissible even
though similar statements to a layperson may not be).
7. See generally Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396-97
(5th Cir. 1961) (classical discussion of general requirements for admission of hearsay evidence); 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1420 (relating the general purpose of the rule excluding hearsay to the
keys to the exceptions--circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and necessity). Necessity in
some situations is used almost literally, as where the declarant is unavailable because of death (dying
declarations). In other situations, the term is used to mean that evidence of equal value is not
presently available (excited utterances). Finally, in some situations, convenience would be a more
appropriate term than necessity (business records). Id. § 1421.
The "mix" of trustworthiness and necessity is not consistent among exceptions. In some excep-
tions, only one of the two factors is particularly strong; in others, one may be almost entirely lacking.
Id. § 1423.
8. "Necessity" is present in some statements-those concerning an existing condition, particu-
larly those involving subjective symptoms, where the statements of the "patient" are the only practi-
cal available information. See 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 443, at 594 &
n.75 (1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 803(4)[01], at 144 & n.9. However, for
such statements, the instant exception is unnecessary. The exception for statements of then-existing
physical or mental condition, embodied in rule 803(3), would be applicable regardless of who was
the auditor of the statement. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 291 (gener-
ally courts have not required statements of bodily feeling to be made to a physician to qualify as an
exception).
9. Hearsay is excluded because uncross-examined out-of-court statements are seen as raising
four testimonial infirmities: errors in narration (sometimes referred to as ambiguity), faulty percep-
tion, erroneous memory, and insincerity. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958
(1974). Theoretically, statements are received under a hearsay exception when some or all of these
infirmities are minimized or eliminated. Id. at 964-65. In making the determination concerning
admissibility, courts and commentators focus the inquiry upon necessity, see supra note 7, and trust-
worthiness, examining trustworthiness in terms of how the potential exception meets the four testi-
monial infirmities. See, eg., 4 D. LOUiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, § 444, at 593-94.
Under the present exception, since the declarant is generally describing her own symptoms, the
hearsay dangers of misperception and erroneous memory are minimal, and because of the perceived
importance of treatment and the resulting care of the declarant in reciting accurately her condition,
the danger of faulty narration is diminished. Id. However, the reduction of the insincerity danger
appears to be the chief justification for this hearsay exception.
10. The exception as defined by the federal rule also allows admission of statements from the
patient of past symptoms and medical history, which were excluded from the exception under the
common law in many jurisdictions. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 803(4)[01], at
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A. Rationale for Statements for the Purpose of Diagnosis Only
When the exception is applied to child sexual abuse cases, the most impor-
tant of the changes in its scope is the expansion of the exception to cover state-
ments made to nontreating doctors. The rationale for this change was rather
poorly developed, however, and the official commentary provided little assist-
ance in understanding the full implications.
The Advisory Committee Note states that "[c]onventional doctrine" ex-
cluded statements made to a physician solely for diagnostic purposes from the
hearsay exception because they were not within its guarantee of truthfulness-
"the patient's strong motivation to be truthful."'" The Note, however, also ob-
serves that, even if the statements were not admitted under the exception to the
hearsay rule, the expert was typically permitted to recite the statements if they
formed a basis of his opinion. The Committee justified the expansion to elimi-
nate this needless formalism:
The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by the
juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is con-
sistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert
testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordi-
narily relied upon by experts in the field.
12
The rationale for expansion of the traditional scope of this hearsay excep-
tion is thus straightforward, but it is quite limited. The statement made by the
declarant to the doctor for purposes of diagnosis would be heard by the jury
when the doctor described the basis of his opinion regardless of whether it was
received as a hearsay exception. Because the jury was unlikely to be able, or
perhaps willing, to limit its consideration of the statement, the Committee rea-
soned that the statement should be received for its truth. However, as the above
quotation indicates, the expansion is justified by the analogy to the treatment of
143; see United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1980) (discussing the changes
from common law made by the rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
Under the common law, when statements were made to doctors consulted solely for the purpose
of diagnosis and typically in the anticipation of offering trial testimony, an array of restrictions had
developed. These restrictions arose from the belief that the declarant had in such instances a selfish
interest not in conveying accurately and honestly her symptoms but in exaggerating them. See Com-
ment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rule: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
1077, 1134 (1969) ("[IThe declarant has every motive not to speak truthfully.").
When made for diagnosis only, some courts refused to admit even statements of present pain or
symptoms for their truth despite the fact that such statements would have been received if made to a
lay witnesses. Others rejected altogether statements of medical history or received them for the
limited purpose of explaining the expert's opinion. Finally, some courts refused to receive state-
ments of subjective, as opposed to objective, symptoms even as the basis of an expert opinion. Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 293. Apparently, the federal rule had the effect of
eliminating all these subsidiary distinctions as well.
However, as discussed below, one may properly question whether statements conceruing a past
event relating exclusively to possible psychological injuries should be admissible as a class. Id. § 292,
at 840 n.8 (validity of hearsay exception to physicians may be questioned regarding statements to
psychiatrists because of declarant's condition and breadth of psychiatric interview). Cf 4 J. WEIN-
STEiN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, % 803(4)[01], at 147 (suggesting that a court might find state-
ments made only for the purpose of diagnosis insufficient to sustain a verdict when the declarant is
available but fails to testify).
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
12. Id.
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statements made to experts under rule 703-where the statements are not re-
ceived for their truth as they are when received under a hearsay exception.'
3
One, therefore, immediately is either presented with an apparently irrational in-
consistency or is faced with the task of developing a set of principles to limit and
rationalize this aspect of the exception.
While the distinction between admitting a statement under a hearsay excep-
tion and receiving it for a limited purpose to support the expert's opinion may be
lost on juries, the distinction does have substantive significance. 14 The impor-
tance of receiving the statement for its truth under a hearsay exception is illus-
trated in the situations where the opinion of the expert is not admissible in the
case and where the statement made to the expert is the only evidence offered on
a critical point. If the statement is received substantively under a hearsay excep-
tion, then it would be received in each of the above situations and could be used
by the jury as proof of a critical fact. As will be discussed below, both of these
fact patterns are realistic; indeed, both have occurred in recent cases. 15
Given potentially significant consequences, a coherent justification should
exist for treating statements to medical experts under rule 803(4) as a hearsay
exception and giving them substantive effect, when, on the other hand, state-
ments to all other experts are received under rule 703 only to support the ex-
pert's opinion if one is elicited in trial testimony. However, the Advisory
Committee Note provides no affirmative explanation for why these statements to
medical experts should be substantively received.' 6 One must therefore search
for justifying principles.
Weinstein and Berger in their treatise suggest generally that "the particular
facts relied on will be trustworthy because the integrity and specialized skill of
13. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.1, at 629 & nn.19 & 20 (2d ed.
1986).
14. In Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965
(1988), the court was harshly critical of the logic of the expansion of the hearsay exception to state-
ments for the purpose of medical diagnosis alone. It identified the critical error as the abandonment
of any examination of the declarant's subjective state of mind and an exclusive examination of the
objective medical pertinence of the doctor's inquiry. The court argued that
[Flor the first time in the history of hearsay law, the state of mind of the hearsay deelarant
is effectively ignored.... The mind of the declarant had been the "ever-fixed mark" from
which our gaze never wandered. In United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985),
we are suddenly and unbelievably reckoning the value of the hearsay not upon the state of
mind of the hearsay declarant, but upon the state of mind of the hearsay auditor.
Id. at 45, 536 A.2d at 687.
15. E.g., State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 462, 358 S.E.2d 679, 684 (1987) (despite the fact that
the declarant repudiated statement identifying the defendant as the perpetrator, hearsay statement
received); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 16-17, 354 S.E.2d 527, 536 (statements made to clinical
psychologist by child to determine whether child could distinguish fact from fantasy and whether
child could have easily been coached into false allegations admitted; opinions by expert on those
issues apparently inadmissible under state authority), disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64
(1987); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 434-35, 406 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Wis. 1987) (statements to
psychologist need not be used to form medical opinion).
16. As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 12, the only justification is the general
futility of limited admissibility of such statements, but such an argument does not explain why state-
ments to medical experts should be treated differently than those to other experts under rule 703
where they are not admitted for their truth.
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the expert will keep him from basing his opinion on questionable matter."'1 7
With regard to medical testimony in particular, they suggest that reliability
is enhanced by procedural rules, and the hearsay dangers inherent in a
rule like 803(4) are consequently diminished. Provisions in Rule 35 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure referred to by Congress ... entitle the parties to obtain
copies of their adversaries' medical reports prior to trial, thereby en-
abling them to prepare for effective cross-examination. In a civil case,
the threat of one-sided medical testimony is further obviated by provi-
sions authorizing the court to order a party to submit to a physical or
mental examination.
18
The McCormick treatise provides a related justification: "The general reliance
upon 'subjective' facts by the medical profession and the ability of its members
to evaluate the accuracy of statements made to them is considered sufficient
protection against contrived symptoms." 19
From the above authorities and on the basis of general principles, one can
develop a number of plausible reasons why statements offered to medical experts
would be received for their truth, while those made to other experts would not.
First, procedural rules governing the discovery of opinions by such experts give
a special guarantee of their reliability since such statements will be more thor-
oughly tested by the adversary process than others. Second, medical experts
compose a group of highly skilled and carefully trained professionals. Third,
because of the size and the maturity of the medical profession, an established
group of experts will be available to both sides in the litigation to test thoroughly
any opinion and the reliability of the statements forming its foundation. 20 Fi-
nally, arguably medical experts are part of a "harder" and more precise science
than many of the fields in which individuals can presently be certified to give
expert testimony2 under the liberal standards of the Federal Rules.
2 2
17. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 803(4)[01], at 146.
18. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 803(4)[01], at 146-47.
19. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 293, at 842.
20. An analogous argument has been made with regard to the receipt of new scientific evidence
under the general scientific acceptance standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). In United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court argued that the
general acceptance test protects both sides "by assuring that a minimal reserve of experts exists who
can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case.... mThe ability
to produce rebuttal experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular
technique, may prove to be essential."
21. See, eg., United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1458 (9th Cir. 1987) (paid informant
entitled to testify as expert witness in drug operations as result of participation in 50 drug sales; drug
investigator permitted to testify as expert that defendants engaged in "counter-surveillance" driving
techniques associated with cocaine transactions); United States v. Kahn, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d. Cir.
1986) (drug agent may give expert testimony concerning mode of dress favored by Pakistani drug
dealers); Reineke v. Cobb Co. School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (teacher's
affadavit as expert admitted concerning disruption of class in censorship case involving school
newspaper).
22. Federal rule 702 only requires that the expert be able to "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 702. The test is "'whether the
untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the
particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject
involved in the dispute.'" FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Ladd, Expert
1989]
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Each of these explanations has some plausibility, and unless there is in fact
no affirmative justification for including statements that form the basis of a med-
ical expert's opinion within this exception, they, or some similar arguments,
must provide that rationale. 23
B. Statements of Causation, Fault, and Identity
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) expanded the hearsay exception for state-
ments given for medical diagnosis or treatment in a second major way. It gener-
ally admits statements of causation and fault, and, as this exception has been
applied in child sexual abuse cases, identity of the perpetrator. This expansion
of the scope of the exception raises major issues regardless of which of the two
trustworthiness rationales is employed.
Under rule 803(4) statements concerning "the cause or external source" of
a medical condition are admissible.24 While the language of the rule itself in-
cludes statements of causation, the Advisory Committee Note indicates that
statements concerning fault would generally fall outside the scope of the rule.25
With regard to the admission of statements of causation and the exclusion of
fault, the key analytical feature is the pertinency of each type of statement to
diagnosis or treatment.26 Rule 803(4) requires that all statements admitted
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952)). As a result, the rule requires relatively little exper-
tise, because injury cases the expert need be only marginally more qualified to evaluate a set of facts
by virtue of some specialized training or experience than the lay jury in order to provide some
assistance as required by the rule. See generally 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, § 382
(1979) (surveying cases admitting testimony of experts who assist the jury only minimally).
23. Alternatively one may conclude that no distinction between medical experts and those in
other fields was presumed at all by the drafters of rule 803(4). Instead the assumption may have
been that in most cases some element of selfish treatment interest will exist, although it may not be
sufficiently separate to justify the hearsay exception. Given the generally insignificant difference
between receiving the statement for its truth and for the limited purpose of supporting an opinion,
the Committee may have concluded that drawing careful distinctions was not worth the judicial time
and energy necessary. Whether or not intended by the drafters, the practical argument set out above
has appeal in many situations. However, it seems insufficient to sustain application of the exception
if in broad categories of situations, which could be identified relatively easily, the justification for
receiving the statements is lacking. It is my premise that there are such readily identifiable situations
in child sexual abuse prosecutions and that, when confronted with them, one should either be able to
justify treating medical experts differently from those in other fields or should not receive statements
made to medical experts under a hearsay exception.
I shall assume throughout the remainder of the Article that some form of these explanations for
the different treatment of medical experts justifies the extension of rule 803(4) to receive statements
made to them as a hearsay exception.
24. FED. R. EvID. 803(4). Admitting statements of cause expands the traditional common law
formulation. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980) (majority rule prior to
enactment of federal rule excluded statements concerning cause from the exception), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
25. The Advisory Committee Note provides a helpful example of the distinction between cause
and fault. A statement that the patient was injured when struck by an automobile, a statement of
cause of injury, would be admissible. A statement that the automobile which struck the patient ran a
red light, a statement of fault, would not be received under the exception. FED. R. EVID. 803(4)
advisory committee's note.
26. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note explains the dichotomy on the basis that the guarantee
of trustworthiness "also extends to statements as to causation, reasonably pertinent to the same




under it be pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 27 Statements of causation gener-
ally pertinent to diagnosis and treatment are accordingly admissible; statements
of fault, which as a class are typically irrelevant to diagnosis or treatment, are
excluded.
While medical pertinency is required under both rationales, the focus and
function of the pertinency requirement differs between the two. Under the self-
ish treatment interest rationale, pertinency to diagnosis or treatment is an indi-
rect, medically objective standard designed to ensure that the declarant's
statement serves his selfish treatment interest. Because this rationale focuses on
the declarant's state of mind, its substantive concern is not the actual medical
pertinency of the statement since pertinency in not in fact required for the state-
ment to be trustworthy. The real issue is the declarant's belief that an accurate
and truthful statement is important to proper treatment. The critical question is
whether this declarant, or a reasonable declarant, if an objective standard is to
be used, would perceive the relevance of the statement to obtaining proper
treatment.
As a result, a subject that the medical expert knows to be medically perti-
nent but which would not suggest pertinency to the layman would not satisfy the
theory of trustworthiness under the selfish treatment interest rationale, even
though it might satisfy its literal requirements. On the other hand, statements
that might actually be irrelevant to diagnosis or treatment from the view of the
trained medical professional should be admissible if a lay declarant would rea-
sonably believe the statement important to such treatment.2 8 In summary,
under the selfish treatment interest rationale, reasonable pertinency is not a sub-
stantive requirement but is rather a somewhat imprecise, although rather easily
applied, objective standard used to indicate a subjective belief of the declarant.29
As noted above, rule 803(4) and the Advisory Committee Note provide
some general guidelines in ruling on admissibility of two issues-general causa-
tion and fault. The definition of statements covered by rule 803(4) includes gen-
eral cause. This definition apparently reflects the judgment of the drafters that
declarants generally subjectively view cause as relevant to proper treatment.
And the statement in the Advisory Committee Note that, in the main, state-
ments of fault should be excluded suggests the opposite conclusion concerning
the typical subjective perceptions of declarants as to this issue. While these
guidelines are useful, greater clarity in the function of reasonable medical perti-
nency under the two trustworthiness rationales would have been helpful. Given
that the medical importance of statements of cause, fault, or identity is not gen-
erally obvious to the layman, if the medical expert does not explain the medical
relevancy of the inquiry, such subjects might well as a general category have
been excluded under the selfish treatment interest rationale.
27. For the text of rule 803(4), see supra note 1.
28. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, § 444, at 598.
29. Even though the focus under this rationale is on the perception of the declarant, using a
standard of reasonable medical pertinency that is viewed from the perspective of the doctor could be
justified in some cases where no reasonable determination of the declarant's actual or likely percep-
tion could be made. Such cases, however, should be rare.
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Admitting that ease of application is an important concern for any rule, it
remains difficult to justify using a general objective rule to decide classes of cases
if the assumptions that guide the objective standard do not hold true. For in-
stance, either because of the subject matter or the characteristics of the declar-
ant, a child may have no subjective appreciation of the importance of the inquiry
to medical treatment. When the statement concerns matters related only to psy-
chological well being, subjective appreciation of the treatment implications of a
statement are likely as a class to be weak, and are likely to be particularly weak
under some circumstances, such as when the statements are made by very imma-
ture children or when children are questioned in the context of play.
30
While reasonable medical pertinency acts only as a proxy for the subjective
understanding of the declarant under the selfish treatment interest rationale, it
plays a different role when a statement is admitted because it forms a basis for
the medical expert's opinion. Reasonable medical pertinency is here a direct
limitation on admissibility. Its function is to assure a linkage between the state-
ment and an opinion of the medical expert which is based upon the statement.
The pertinency requirement guarantees that the statement is relevant to a sub-
ject matter about which the medical expert is qualified to give an opinion. The
focus under the second rationale is properly and directly upon the expert's opin-
ion of what is pertinent.3 1 It is an objective determination of the reasonable
relationship between the statement and the opinion that is at issue, not the sub-
jective perception of the patient.
Thus, within the two trustworthiness rationales, the reasonable medical
pertinency requirement has different roles. It is important to note that the testi-
mony of the expert as to medical pertinency is decisive under the basis-of-the-
expert's-opinion rationale but does not itself determine whether a statement is
trustworthy with regard to the selfish treatment interest rationale. Under the
latter rationale, the expert's testimony as to what is medically pertinent serves
30. See State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 448, 406 N.W.2d 385, 397 (1987) (Heffeman, C.J.,
dissenting) (method for eliciting information was to simulate play, which was at odds with operation
of selfish treatment interest rationale). In granting habeas corpus relief, the district court relied
heavily upon this dissenting opinion. Nelson v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304, 1322-24 (E.D. Wis.
1988).
To note that interviewing a child in the context of play undermines the basis of admitting
statements made under the selfish treatment interest rationale does not mean that the questioning
technique is inappropriate, particularly at the initial phases of an investigation. Social scientists have
long recognized that different questioning methods have different strengths and weaknesses. For
example, witnesses who describe events in narrative form are highly accurate but omit much detail.
On the other hand, those questioned with specific inquiries recall much more detail, but they much
more frequently err in recalling those details. Lipton, On the Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 90, 93 (1977). Even leading questions, which have the greatest potential
to distort, have their purposes, such as prompting a witness to recite unpleasant facts. D. BINDER &
S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 47 (1977).
The questioning technique used in Nelson clearly has its place in the information gathering
process. However, the circumstances of the questioning put it outside the guarantees of trustworthi-
ness of the selfish treatment interest rationale.
31. See Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1986) (in case in which declarant was
someone who brought injured person to the hospital but where her precise relation to patient was
uncertain, court looked exclusively to whether the statements were "of the type reasonably pertinent




only to indicate indirectly the declarant's state of mind. Accordingly, objective
medical pertinency should logically be abandoned as a decision rule for state-
ments under the latter rationale when, as to a general class, it produces results of
questionable validity.
C. Two Different Rationales-Different Dimensions and Limitations
for the Exception
Two distinct theories guarantee the trustworthiness of statements under the
expanded hearsay exception for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.
As a result, the exception produced is, or at least ought to be, of varying dimen-
sion depending upon the operative theory. The differences in the proper scope of
the exception have important implications for admission of statements in typical
fact patterns that arise in child sexual abuse cases.
1. Statements Forming Basis for Relevant, Admissible Opinion
Under the rationale that statements are admissible because they form the
basis of the expert's opinion, the only explicit justification for the hearsay excep-
tion, albeit a limited, largely negative one, is that the statements would be heard
by the jury in any event since they would be admitted for the limited purpose of
showing the basis of the expert's opinion. Logically, then, a prerequisite to ad-
mission of the statement should be that the expert testify in the case, giving a
relevant, admissible opinion as to which the statement provides a basis.
32
By contrast, under the selfish treatment interest rationale, the exception
should not impose a requirement that the auditor testify or render an opinion to
which the hearsay statement must relate. Such requirements are unnecessary
and indeed erroneous where the selfish interest of the declarant in receiving
proper care operates. Trustworthiness exists separately from whether the state-
ment is used by the auditor, who need not be an expert, and the jury should
properly hear it because of that trustworthiness regardless of whether the audi-
tor testifies and gives an opinion based on the statement.
2. Statements Relating to Physical or Psychological Condition
Rule 803(4) provides no definition for the term medical diagnosis or treat-
ment. In this regard, the federal rule differs from the uniform rule in that
mental conditions are not explicitly eliminated, as they were under the uniform
rule's requirement that the statement relate to "an issue of declarant's bodily
condition."1
33
Under the basis-of-the-expert's-opinion rationale, the special reliability of
the medical expert's evaluation provides the guarantee of trustworthiness. This
32. "It should be noted that Rule 803(4) does not require the diagnosing physician to testify.
In light, however, of the rationale.., for including within Rule 803(4) statements made for purposes
of obtaining a diagnosis, it would be well to restrict receipt of such statements to those cases in which
the diagnosing physician in fact testifies, and in which his diagnosis is relevant." 4 D. LOUISELL &
C. MUELLER, supra note 8, § 444, at 596.
33. UNIF. R. EvID. 63(12)(b) (1953).
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reliability may derive from the particular skill, the special expertise, and perhaps
the "hard science" nature of the profession. A substantial argument may there-
fore be made that the exception should be limited to the generally more precise
and objective determination of physical, as opposed to mental, condition. In any
case, the term "medical" as used in the exception should be defined with care to
assure that the statements made to medical experts relating to diagnosis or treat-
ment have sufficient trustworthiness.
The appropriate result here is complicated by the fact that psychiatrists
hold medical degrees and some mental disorders have clear physiological
causes. 34 Others in the field, clinical psychologists, for example, render similar
opinions and provide similar treatment but are not medical doctors. The courts,
however, often receive their opinions into evidence just as those of psychia-
trists.35 Nevertheless, there can be little argument that as a class psychological
maladies are less subject to verification than physical maladies.
Under the selfish treatment interest rationale, while clearly all statements
made for the purpose of receiving treatment of psychological, as opposed to
physical, ills do not necessarily lack a selfish treatment interest, it is difficult to
contend that as a group they are made with the same degree of selfish interest in
preventing inappropriate treatment as when the statements relate to somatic ail-
ments.36 Admission should rest upon the actual perception of the declarant that
her well being is likely to be affected as a result of the statement made. Because
of the difficulty of making this determination in each case, it might be reason-
able, although not theoretically imperative, to limit the hearsay exception to
statements with apparent significance to treatment of a physical malady. As a
minimum, some limits should be placed on the exception to exclude the more
esoteric psychological issues where the statements have no apparent treatment
implications likely to affect the health of the declarant.
3. Identity of the Expert
If, as developed above, statements to medical experts are treated as a hear-
34. For example, in the criminal context see Shah & Roth, Biological and Psychophysiological
Factors in Criminality in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 101 (D. Glasser ed. 1974). See generally
Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for
Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427 (1980) (dealing with the use of expert testimony by
mental health professionals).
35. For example, clinical psychologists with suitable experience have been permitted to render
opinions concerning many mental conditions in insanity cases. See Jenkins v. United States, 307
F.2d 637, 642-46 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Indeed, because they are trained in administering objective tests,
their data and opinions are arguably more reliable than those rendered by psychiatrists. For exam-
ple, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), used by many clinical psychologists,
has several scales that reveal malingering by the subject. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 34, at 506
n.233.
36. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666 (1987), cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541
A.2d 965 (1988). There the court concluded that a two-year-old lacked the maturity to understand
or appreciate the link between her statements and proper treatment. Id. at 29-30, 536 A.2d at 680.
The court concluded generally that, once the statement left the subject of physical injuries, the rea-
son to have confidence in the trustworthiness of the statement-the patient's fear that, unless accu-
rate information is supplied, proper treatment for injury or disease will not be forthcoming-was
substantially diminished. Id. at 30, 536 A.2d at 682-83.
[Vol. 67
HEARSA Y EXCEPTION
say exception because of the special skill and expertise and the established nature
of this specialized profession that provides an assurance of trustworthiness to
statements relied upon, then the required qualifications of those receiving such
statements should be carefully prescribed. 37 The exception might logically be
limited exclusively to statements made to physicians or at least to a limited,
highly trained group of health care professionals.
38
On the other hand, if trustworthiness flows from the subjective desire of the
patient to receive treatment and not from the expertise of the auditor of the
statement, then the identity of the immediate auditor is far less critical. 39 The
Advisory Committee's Note asserts that statements under the exception might
include statements to "hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members
of the family." 4 Clearly the Committee's explanation makes sense regarding
statements in which the subjective selfish interest of the declarant is involved
and she believes the statement will be transmitted to medical personnel to secure
proper treatment. It would, however, not apply to statements admitted because
37. While this Article contends that the specific expertise of the auditor should be a concern
under this second rationale, this restriction results only because of the need to rationalize special
hearsay treatment for statements made to medical experts. In general, specific formal training and
advanced academic degrees are not required when the only concern is whether an individual qualifies
to give expert testimony. Under rule 702 an expert may be qualified "by knowledge, experience,
training or education." FED. R. EVID. 702. The Commentary to the federal rule notes specifically
that "within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physi-
cians. . . , but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses." FED. R. EViD. 702 advi-
sory committee's note.
38. Different measures of qualifications might be imposed. Among the criteria are: training in
the "hard" science of medical care; medical or other advanced degrees, if the extensiveness of train-
ing were seen as the key factor; and a professional label that brings the expert within certain discov-
ery rules, if those discovery rules are seen as ensuring effective adversarial testing. A combination of
these criteria might properly be used, since the legislative history gives no guidance on the exact
basis of the distinction between medical experts and others. The lack of clear definition, however, is
not adequate reason to require no rational basis to distinguish between the groups.
The failure of courts to limit either the types of experts to whom admissible statements may be
made, discussed above, or the types of maladies to which such statements may relate, examined here,
renders the validity of the exception's expansion extraordinarily tenuous. See infra note 105.
39. [S]tatements made to a nurse, a medical student, an ambulance driver, someone mas-
querading as a physician or a member of one's family would probably qualify under this
exception if the patient thought the statements were for purpose of treatment or diagnosis.
Under the theory of the exception, at least as it relates to treatment, this makes sense, for it
is the patient's belief in making the statement which provides a guarantee of truthfulness.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 421 (2d ed. 1982) (emphasis
added).
State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368, 536 A.2d 600, cerL denied, 207 Conn. 808, 541 A.2d
1239 (1988), presents an excellent factual pattern demonstrating the insignificance of the identity of
the person receiving the statements when the declarant makes them with the belief that they will be
transmitted to a physician. There the examining physician, who could not speak Spanish, enlisted
the aid of a security guard fluent in the language to take the medical history from a child who spoke
no English. Id. at 369, 536 A.2d at 601. Clearly those statements satisfied the purposes of the rule's
requirement. While the doctor was absent, the child also indicated that her father had molested her,
but she would not repeat that statement in the presence of the physician. Id. at 370, 536 A.2d at 601.
Whether these latter statements should be admitted under the selfish treatment interest rationale is
far less clear since the intention of the child in sharing them only with her confidant is ambiguous
and there is some reason to believe they were not provided for treatment purposes at all. See also
State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 84-85, 337 S.E.2d 833, 839-40 (1985) (statements to grandmother ad-
mitted under selfish interest rationale); infra text accompanying notes 48-51 (discussing the Smith
decision).
40. FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
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they form the basis of an expert's opinion, since a family member, for instance,
would have no expertise to form an opinion for which the declaration would
provide a relevant basis.
4 1
III. APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION UNDER RULE 803(4) To
ISSUES IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
This section examines the major issues with which courts have grappled in
applying rule 803(4) to child sexual assault and abuse cases. This section uses
opinions from North Carolina, Wisconsin, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit to illustrate the confusion in analysis that has re-
sulted from the failure of courts to appreciate that two separate theories of
trustworthiness underlie the exception. These three jurisdictions have generally
given the exception a liberal and expansive interpretation, although they remain
within the mainstream of current judicial analysis.
A. Statements for the Purpose of Treatment or Diagnosis:
Confusion of Rationales
In State v. Smith,42 the North Carolina Supreme Court analyzed for the
first time the state's new hearsay rule covering statements made for the purpose
of diagnosis or treatment.43 In Smith the defendant was charged with sexual
offenses against the daughter and niece of the woman with whom he was living.
The two girls were four and five years old. The prosecution sought to admit
under rule 803(4) statements by the two children to their grandmother and to
two counselors at the local Rape Crisis Center.44
The incident came to light when, approximately three days after the assault,
the younger girl told her grandmother about the assault. The grandmother had
a similar conversation with the other child upon the child's return from school.
As a result of these conversations both children were taken to the hospital by
their mothers.45 In addition, the younger child told a volunteer with the Rape
Task Force about the incident. The volunteer, who was a registered nurse, had
41. Cf. People v. Wilkins, 134 Mich. App. 39, 46, 349 N.W.2d 815, 818 (1984) (the breadth of
the subject matter covered by the exception depends on whether the statement is made directly to a
doctor or to a layman since, if not made directly to a physician, the hearer would generally need only
limited information for the purpose of securing medical assistance).
42. 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); see Note, Evidence-North Carolina Allows Admission
of the Unthinkable: Hearsay Exceptions and Statements made by Sexually Abused Children-State
v. Smith, 9 CAMPBELL L. REv. 437, 470-71 (1987) (applauding accommodation of rule 803(4) to
child sexual abuse situation to permit maximum admission of evidence to convict assailants); Note,
State v. Smith: Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 64
N.C.L. REv. 1352, 1362-63 (1986) (noting possible distorting effects of using traditional hearsay
exceptions to treat child sexual abuse cases and suggesting enactment of special hearsay statute).
43. North Carolina adopted rules of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules in 1984, and while
some states modified the federal model, see supra note 2, N.C. R. EvID. 803(4) and the federal rule
are identical.
44. 315 N.C. at 79-81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
45. Id. at 81, 84, 337 S.E.2d at 837, 839. In one instance, the grandmother told her daughter,




first met the child in the hospital emergency room after the child had received
treatment. She had been called to the hospital in her capacity as counselor from
the Task Force, not as a nurse, and was not involved in diagnosing the child's
condition but in "treating the emotional effects" of the incident.46 Another vol-
unteer, who apparently had no formal medical training, had similar conversa-
tions with the second child, whom she first met two days after the child's
treatment at the hospital. 47
The court first held that the statements of the children to their grandmother
concerning what had happened were admissible under rule 803(4).48 The basis
for admitting these statements was the patient's selfish treatment interest ration-
ale. Courts have long recognized that this selfish interest rationale is applicable
when the declarant made the statement to someone who is not a doctor if made
for the purpose of having that information relayed to the doctor.49 While the
children did not specifically request medical treatment, the court argued that
small children would not be expected independently to seek out or specifically to
request medical treatment but instead would rely on their caretakers to obtain
treatment if it was considered necessary. 50 In addition, circumstantial evidence
corroborated that these statements were made for medical treatment purposes.
First, the statements themselves concerned physical condition-bleeding and
pain. 51 Second, as an immediate result of the statements, the children were
taken to the hospital.
5 2
The court concluded, however, that the statements made to the two Rape
Task Force volunteers were not admissible. 53 The analysis here was not clear.
It either confuses the rationales supporting the exception or reflects an indirect
attempt to impose sophisticated limitations on the exception where statements
relate to psychological well being. The court noted that the witnesses were not
"licensed as medical doctors or psychologists."' 54 They "did not pretend to di-
agnose the girls' medical 'condition' as Rape Task Force volunteers, but worked
with them in treating the emotional effects of the events described by the
girls." 5 5 The court stated that, while there was some possibility that the
younger child might have confused the volunteer with the hospital personnel
who were treating her injuries since she first met the counselor in the emergency
room, it was unwilling to extend the exception to statements made to persons
acting as volunteers after the victims had received treatment and diagnosis at the
46. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
47. Id. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
48. Id. at 84-85, 337 S.E.2d at 839-40. In another portion of the opinion, the Smith court held
admissible statements of one of the children to her grandmother concerning the identity of the de-
fendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Id. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840; see infra note 98.
49. "Under the exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements to
hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family might be included." FED. R.
EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's note (quoted verbatim in N.C. R. EviD. 803(4) commentary).
50. Smith, at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
51. Id. at 84-85, 337 S.E.2d at 839-40.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
54. Id. at 85-86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
55. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
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hospital.56
One reading of this portion of the opinion is that the auditor must be a
member of a profession with specialized expertise and specific types of formal
training-such as psychologists and medical doctors.5 7 Alternatively the opin-
ion may be suggesting that the treatment involved must be medical, as opposed
to psychological, treatment, More narrowly, the opinion suggests that state-
ments concerning psychological well being have a sufficient guarantee of trust-
worthiness only if the record gives an affirmative indication that the declarant
believes the statements she makes will be used for her treatment. 58 Each of
these points deserved careful attention, but the court did not clarify its reasoning
further.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's second treatment of the exception
came in a confusing opinion in State v. Stafford.59 There the court excluded
statements made to a pediatrician by a thirteen-year-old child three days before
defendant's trial for criminal sexual assault of the child began. The child's state-
ments concerned weight loss, vomiting, emotional reactions, and decrease in
school performance in the six-month period since the doctor had first seen the
child. The court concluded the statements were not admissible: "As the prose-
cuting witness did not visit [the doctor] for diagnosis or treatment and [the doc-
56. Id. at 85-86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
57. The analysis suggests confusion between rationales in that the opinion ostensibly focuses on
the selfish interest of the declarant at the same time it applies restrictions that should be relevant
only to the rationale for statements serving as the basis of an expert's testimony. However, under the
general principles that govern expert testimony, no reason is apparent why these two witnesses might
not be qualified as experts in the treatment of psychological trauma resulting from rape. See supra
note 22. Perhaps the court was recognizing implicitly a need to limit the types of medical expertise
considered sufficient under the exception to highly trained experts in the medical field.
Alternatively, the testimony may have been rejected on the basis that psychological treatment is
not within the exception. This is a point that may have relevance under both rationales of the rule.
Such a general limitation does not appear to be a correct reading of the opinion, however, since the
court seemed to suggest that holding a formal degree as a psychologist would have mattered. 315
N.C. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840; see State v. Bullock, 320 N.C. 780, 783, 360 S.E.2d 689, 690-91 (1987)
(holding admissible statement to psychologist). The more accurate reading may be that psychologi-
cal treatment performed by persons not holding formal degrees will not be received. This may be a
reasonable, practical limitation, but it appears without substantial foundation in an exception based
on the selfish treatment interest of the declarant. Accordingly, the distinction drawn by the court
appears to be based on the second rationale for the rule the basis of the expert's opinion-a rationale
never explicitly relied upon by the court in its opinion.
58. A distinction should be drawn, for example, between statements made for the purpose of
giving the psychotherapist information to determine future treatment and statements which are
made as part of the give and take process of therapy. Statements in the former category provide
information. Those in the latter are tools of treatment. One might wonder whether every statement
made during the process of therapy has a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness.
Such a distinction might have been intended by the court in Smith. Statements made during the
diagnostic process, even relating to psychological injury and treatment were admissible, but those
made during the treatment process itself, particularly where those administering the treatment are
volunteers, were not found admissible. Cf. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 342-48, 745 P.2d 12,
15-18 (1987) (en bane) (drawing distinction between rape truama syndrome, a nonjudgmental ther-
aputic tool, and other more reliable scientific methods of proof that were devised to determine exist-
ence of event); People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 300-01, 249-51, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
458-60 (1984) (same). But see Department of Social Servs. v. Freiburger, 153 Mich. App. 251, 256-
58, 395 N.W.2d 300, 302-03 (1986) (statements to psychiatric social worker during therapy concern-
ing identification of perpetrator held admissible).
59. 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986).
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tor] neither diagnosed nor treated her, the motivation to tell the truth is simply
not present." 6°
The physician's trial testimony consisted, as the court described it, of his
listing some of the symptoms of the "rape trauma syndrome" and various symp-
toms the victim told him she had experienced. 6 1 However, the doctor never
diagnosed the prosecuting witness as suffering from the syndrome.62 Accord-
ingly, the court's exclusion of the statements is easy to rationalize, although such
a result is hardly trivial. 63 The court's apparent rationale is that where no treat-
ment is sought or intended, hearsay statements may be received only when used
to form the basis of the doctor's opinion.64 Because the doctor rendered no
opinion-indeed, it was unclear whether the North Carolina courts would re-
ceive testimony concerning the "rape trauma syndrome" 6 5-the statements of
the victim were not properly admissible.
66
60. Id. at 575, 346 S.E.2d at 467.
61. Id. at 571-72, 346 S.E.2d at 465-66.
62. Id. at 574, 346 S.E.2d at 467.
Under North Carolina law, there appears to be an additional basis for excluding the testimony.
North Carolina's rule 702 differs from federal rule 702 in that it does not authorize the expert to
testify both in the form of an opinion "or otherwise" as permitted under the federal rule. N.C. R.
EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 702. The words "or otherwise" in the federal rule are intended to allow
an expert to testify without giving an opinion, authorizing the expert to "give a dissertation or expo-
sition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to
the facts." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. While the North Carolina commentary
does not explain the omission of that language, it appears to mean that the expert's testimony was
inadmissible if it recited the general characteristics of the rape trauma syndrome and repeated the
victim's description of her symptoms under North Carolina rule 702.
63. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
64. There is some support for this reading of the case in State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350
S.E.2d 76 (1986), which notes that "Stafford is distinguishable from the present case, in which the
victim visited [the pediatrician] several months prior to trial. [The doctor here] diagnosed the pa-
tient's condition, whereas in Stafford no diagnosis was made when the victim visited the physician
three days prior to trial." Id. at 596, 350 S.E.2d at 80. The court's reasoning inAguallo, however, is
not entirely clear since it seemed to put great weight on its determination that the purpose of the
examination in Stafford was the preparation of the state's case for trial, not medical diagnosis and
treatment. Id.
65. 317 N.C. at 575-76, 346 S.E.2d at 468.
Courts differ sharply as to the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the rape trauma
syndrome and, if admissible, the permissible uses of such testimony. See generally Massaro, Experts,
Psychology, Credibility, and Rape" The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implicationsfor Expert
Psychological Testimony, 69 MNN. L. REv. 395 (1985) (surveying California, Minnesota, and Mis-
souri cases); McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in
Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1143 (1985) (surveying early rape trauma syndrome cases; argu-
ing in general for admissiblity of expert testimony).
A court's position on the admissibility of expert testimony on the rape trauma syndrome where
the victim is an adult is not necessarily dispositive of the admissibility of apparently similar expert
testimony concerning child sexual abuse. Some courts are more restrictive in admitting testimony
about the rape trauma syndrome. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984) (expert testi-
mony concerning child sexual abuse admissible whereas testimony concerning rape trauma syn-
drome inadmissible because of greater juror ignorance of victim behavior in the former situation).
Cf. State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Haw. 1988) (similar distinction drawn between juror appre-
ciation of conduct of child sexual abuse victim versus adult victim of attempted murder).
66. The result is not trivial, because other states have squarely ruled that statements are admis-
sible even when no opinion is rendered. State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 434-35, 406 N.W.2d 385,
392 (Wis. 1987) (statements to psychologist need not be used to form medical opinion); see also State
v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 16-17, 354 S.E.2d 527, 536 (statements made to clinical psychologist by
child to determine whether child could distinguish fact from fantasy and whether child could have
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately the court did not stop with this analysis but went further
and, in the process, confused and combined the rationales for the exception.
The court suggested restrictions on the exception contrary to the legislative in-
tent of the rule and which, if applied, would create problems of application in
other areas. It gave as a reason for exclusion that the examination was "not for
the purposes of diagnosis or treatment but for the purpose of preparing and
presenting the state's 'rape trauma syndrome.' "67 It further emphasized that
the exception was based on the indicia of reliability produced by the declarant's
selfish interest in obtaining appropriate medical treatment. The court appeared
to say that, when such a selfish treatment interest is absent, the testimony may
not be received.6 8
The result in Stafford was correct. However, unless one carefully untangles
the rationales for the exception and separately treats certain criminal cases, there
is a real danger of badly confusing and distorting accepted law. One of the
major changes in the law worked by rule 803(4), as noted above, was to permit
admission of statements made to doctors consulted only for diagnosis. 69 The
accepted meaning of that expansion is that it permits receipt of statements made
to physicians consulted exclusively for the purpose of testifying in personal in-
easily been coached into false allegations admitted although such opinions if directly given concern-
ing child would be appear to be inadmissible, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987).
67. 317 N.C. at 574, 346 S.E.2d at 467.
In State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988), the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals, relying on Stafford, set out a four-part test for determining whether statements are admissible
under rule 803(4). The factors are:
(1) whether the examination was requested by persons involved in the prosecution of the
case; (2) the proximity of the examination to the victim's initial diagnosis; (3) whether the
victim received a diagnosis or treatment as a result of the examination; and (4) the proxim-
ity of the examination to the trial date.
Id. at 591, 367 S.E.2d at 144 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Deland, 22 M.J. 70, 75
(C.M.A.) ("We will not condone efforts to extend [Military Rule of Evidence] 803(4) to include the
testimony of a psychiatrist whose examination of an alleged victim was more oriented to his testify-
ing than to medical diagnosis or treatment."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 856 (1986).
While these factors were apparently chosen to help assure trustworthiness under the selfish
interest rationale, the factors identified as relevant tell us little, if anything, about the subjective
perception of the child. Instead they focus on the intent of the expert, which is relevant only if one
assumes that the expert's intention will be communicated in some way to the child. Thus, the tests
set out above determine the existence of a selfish treatment interest only in a very crude and indirect
way, and they could hardly be justified as an effective objective method of identifying when the
child's selfish treatment interest was likely to be absent.
68. 317 N.C. at 574-75, 346 S.E.2d at 467. The error committed here of joining the two require-
ments is a relatively common one with the courts, arising typically from the same mistake in two
highly influential opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, United
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981) and United States
v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). See, eg., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949-50 (4th
Cir. 1988) (in civil case, the court described a "two-part test," treating in the conjunctive both
rationales, but ruling irrelevant whether the doctor was consulted for treatment purposes or only in
order to testify); United States v. Deland, 22 M.J. 70, 74-75 (C.M.A.) (in criminal case, the court
treated the test as requiring satisfaction of both rationales and warned that such evidence should not
be received when psychiatrist's examination is more oriented to his testifying at trial than to medical
diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 196 (1986).
69. O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[r]ule 803(4) clearly
permits the admission into evidence of what [plaintiff] told [her doctor] about her condition, so long




Accordingly, Justice Martin, who dissented in Stafford, was properly dis-
turbed. He warned that the decision would render inadmissible statements
made to doctors appointed in worker's compensation-type cases, since they are
also made for trial preparation. Yet such statements have been routinely admit-
ted.7 1 They are admitted because the physician offers a relevant diagnosis for
which the statements form a basis, but there has been no requirement, as sug-
gested by the court in Stafford, that the declarant also be motivated by selfish
interest in receiving appropriate treatment. The reliability of statements made
solely as part of trial preparation is guaranteed only by the medical expert's
reliance upon them to form her opinion.
72
B. Statements of Identification of the Perpetrator
An issue of critical importance in the application of rule 803(4) to child
sexual abuse cases is whether statements of the victim concerning the identity of
the perpetrator are admissible. Most courts that have recently examined the
issue have found that unlike statements of fault, which are generally excluded
from the exception, statements of identification are admissible because of the
special character of diagnosis and treatment issues in child sexual abuse cases.
In this analysis courts have relied chiefly on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Renville.73 Like the
70. Id. at 1088-89. See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, § 444, at 594-95
(expansion consistent with general liberal principles governing expert testimony); 4 J. WEINsTEiN &
M. BERGER, supra note 2, 803(4)[01], at 146-47 (hearsay will be trustworthy "because the integrity
and specialized skill of the [diagnosing] expert will keep him from basing his opinion on a questiona-
ble matter").
71. 317 N.C. at 576-77, 346 S.E.2d at 469.
72. A potential basis for the result in Stafford, although undeveloped by the court, is that the
opinions admissible under rule 803(4) might be restricted to those relating to traditional medical,
and perhaps psychological, diagnosis and treatment. This may be what the court meant when it said
that there was no testimony that the physician was seen "for the purpose of treatment or obtaining a
diagnosis." 317 N.C. at 574, 346 S.E.2d at 467. Instead, he was developing an opinion on the rape
trauma syndrome, which in some jurisdictions is a subject on which a doctor, as an expert, can give
an opinion, but not a subject of traditional medical diagnosis where such diagnosis is aimed ulti-
mately at treatment. See supra note 58.
One might be tempted to suggest that the appropriate basis for the court's standard in Stafford
may be derived from the confrontation clause, which is discussed below. See infra notes 109-32 and
accompanying text. Where the only selfish interest of the declarant, and presumably the expert
retained by the prosecution, is to provide effective trial testimony, the statement might lack the
trustworthiness required by the confrontation clause. However, as discussed below, when the declar-
ant testifies, see infra note 114, as she did in Stafford, 317 N.C. at 575, 346 S.E.2d at 468, and may be
cross-examined effectively, no sixth amendment obstacle exists to admission of her out-of-court
statement. This should be true even though the hearsay statement went "far beyond" the substance
of the in-court testimony. Id.
73. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
The Renville opinion has had a major impact on the the admission of statements of identifica-
tion in child sexual abuse cases. A number of jurisdictions have relied heavily upon its analysis in
admitting such statements. See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 200, 735 P.2d 801, 810 (1987);
Stallnacker v. State, 19 Ark. App. 9, 11-12, 715 S.W.2d 883, 884-85 (1986); State v. Maldonado, 13
Conn. App. 368, 373, 536 A.2d 600, 603, cert denied, 207 Conn. 808, 541 A.2d 1239 (1988); State v.
Vosika, 83 Or. App. 298, 306-07, 731 P.2d 449,454-55, modified on other grounds, 85 Or. App. 148,
735 P.2d 1273 (1987); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 596-97, 350 S.E.2d 76, 80 (1986); see cases
cited in supra note 68.
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North Carolina Supreme Court in Stafford, the Eighth Circuit in Renville con-
fused and ultimately amalgamated the two rationales underlying rule 803(4).74
The Renville court first noted that in sexual abuse cases there are psychological
and emotional components to the injuries that cause diagnosis and treatment
concerns to differ from situations where "the injury is purely somatic."75' These
additional types of harms mean that statements of identity are "reasonably re-
lied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis."' 76 The court, however, was not
content to rest admissibility exclusively on expert reliance on the statements.
I Renville turned to an earlier Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Iron
Shell,7 7 where the court had created a two-part test for admission of statements
under rule 803(4) derived from the dual rationale of the exception. Iron Shell
had recognized the two rationales underlying the exception, and instead of con-
sidering them separately, it had joined them into a single test for admissibility:
"first, is the declarant's motive consistent with the purpose of the rule; and sec-
ond, is it reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or
treatment."' 78 The Renville court required that the statement of identity satisfy
also the first part of the test-a selfish treatment interest consistent with the
purpose of the exception.
79
The Renville court noted that typically statements of fault have not satisfied
the selfish interest criterion:
Ordinarily, when an individual identifies the person responsible for his
injuries or condition, he does so without reasonable expectation that
the information will facilitate treatment.
... [However,] [t]his assumption does not hold where the physi-
cian makes clear to the victim that the inquiry into the identity of the
abuser is important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim
manifests such an understanding. In such circumstances, the victim's
motivation to speak truthfully is the same as that which insures relia-
bility when he recounts the chronology of events or details symptoms
of somatic distress.
80
The record in Renville establishes a somewhat atypical set of facts. Before ques-
tioning the child, the physician explained to her "that the examination and his
prospective questions were necessary to obtain information to treat her and help
her overcome any physical and emotional problems which may have been
caused by the recurrent abuse."' 81 Concluding both that there were sufficient
indicia of the declarant's proper self-interested motivation and that the state-
ments were of a type reasonably relied upon by physicians in treatment or diag-
nosis, the court held the statement of the identity admissible under rule 803(4).82
74. This error in analysis is a common one. See supra note 68.
75. 779 F.2d at 437.
76. Id.
77. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
78. Id. at 84.
79. 779 F.2d at 438.
80. Id. at 438.
81. Id. at 438-39.
82. Id. at 439.
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Renville is a very puzzling case. The problem lies not in the result. That
result is certainly defensible, if not beyond question, assuming that the eleven-
year-old child in the case understood that her statement of identity had some-
thing to do with her treatment.83 Both the meaning of the rule Renville creates
and the way other courts have used it as precedent, however, are troubling. The
court's two-part test, stated in the conjunctive and thus requiring that a state-
ment satisfy both of the exception's trustworthiness rationales, is an erroneous
analysis of the requirements of the hearsay exception under rule 803(4).
As noted above, a statement motivated by the patient's selfish interest in
receiving treatment must be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment in
order to assure that the selfish treatment interest is in fact present, but the rule
imposes no additional requirement that the statement also be reasonably relied
upon by an expert-here a doctor-in rendering an opinion. More importantly,
it is generally not correct that when a statement is made to a doctor for diagnosis
only-the statement being both pertinent to that medical diagnosis and forming
part of the basis for the diagnosis-there is a second requirement that the de-
clarant's motive be "as a patient seeking treatment."184 If the case is read to
impose such an additional requirement, it, like Stafford, would have the effect of
undoing a significant intended effect of the federal rule-to render admissible
statements made to doctors consulted for diagnosis only.
C. Evidentiary Limitations on Admissibility of Statements under Rule 803(4)
in Child Sex Abuse Cases
Section II of this Article develops several general limitations that should be
placed on the admission of statements under rule 803(4) in fact patterns that
83. On the other hand, whether the record need demonstrate the patient's appreciation of the
selfish interest as to every fact is not clear. A court might reasonably require that the patient gener-
ally appreciate the significance of the inquiry to securing appropriate treatment but not necessarily
require her to appreciate the significance of every fact for treatment. Interstitial or related informa-
tion has been received in other areas, as under the hearsay exception for statements against interest,
rule 804(b)(3). Statements that are "collateral" to those actually against interest are often received if
it is clear that the statement as a whole is one that a reasonable person would perceive as against his
interest. See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976) (statement exculpating
defendant as coparticipant within statement inculpating declarant admissible even though identity of
coparticipant was largely "collateral" because the exculpatory element tended to fortify the overall
disserving quality of the statement and since some latitude permitted in admitting contextual state-
ments).
A similar test could reasonably apply to the instant exception. In this context, such a test might
also properly admit additional information not clearly within the trustworthiness guarantee of the
exception. The court in United States v. Deland, 22 M.J. 70, 74 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 856
(1986) stated the test in what would appear to be acceptable terms: "nothing in the record indicates
that [the child] would have believed this [identification] information to be less relevant to treatment
than the other information she was providing [the psychiatrist]."
Before identification statements, for example, are included as ancillary to other statements moti-
vated by the declarant's selfish interest, the prosecution should make a real showing that the declar-
ant had such a subjective recognition of the overall significance of her statements. In the absence of
an initial clear showing that the selfish treatment interest is present, bootstrapping statements of
identification would be particularly inappropriate since such statements will almost of necessity
stretch the limits of the rationale.
84. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. See also Renville, 779 F.2d at 439 ("Nothing in the record
indicates that the child's motive... was other than as a patient responding to a physician question-
ing for prospective treatment.").
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frequently arise in child sexual abuse cases. State v. Nelson 8 5 presents a fact
situation in which a number of these limitations would appear warranted.
In Nelson the defendant, who was charged with sexually abusing his three-
year-old daughter, challenged the admission of statements made by the child to
a clinical psychologist. The statements concerned both the fact of sexual abuse
and defendant's identity as the perpetrator.8 6 The statements were made during
a series of fifty-nine evaluation and treatment sessions over an eight-month pe-
riod. While the psychologist and the child would occasionally speak in the psy-
chologist's office, sessions were generally conducted in a play therapy room.
87
This room was equipped with games, puzzles, coloring books, dolls, and other
toys "which allow a child to express [herself] through play." 8 According to the
psychologist, the child expressed herself only gradually throughout the
sessions.89
The court began by focusing on the selfish treatment interest as providing
the guarantee of trustworthiness under the exception 90 and concluded that the
statement satisfied this rationale. Even though many of the statements were
made in the play therapy room, the court noted that the sessions were scheduled
on a regular, formal basis with many of the trappings of a professional consulta-
tion. The sessions began with a series of tests and evaluations, and the psycholo-
gist made clear that he was not a playmate but was an authority figure.9 1 While
acknowledging the difficulty of determining whether the child understands the
purpose of the statements, the court reached the broad general conclusion that
children have such appreciation:
[W]e do not believe that, because a child is only three or four years of
age at the time he or she goes to a doctor, the child is unable to com-
prehend that the child is involved in the process of receiving diagnosis
or treatment. A child is no less aware of the existence of emotional or
mental pain than physical pain and, thus, is equally aware of the neces-
sity and beneficial nature of therapy.... Just as a child three or four
years of age understands that statements made to a physician will be
used by that physician to ease the physical pain of the child, we con-
clude that such a child also understands that statements made to a
psychologist will be used by the psychologist to ease the emotional or
psychological injuries of the child. 92
85. 138 Wis. 2d 418, 406 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1987). Federal habeas corpus relief was granted on
confrontation grounds. Nelson v. Ferry, 688 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
86. 138 Wis. 2d at 433, 406 N.W.2d at 391.
87. Id. at 431, 406 N.W.2d at 390.
88. Id. at 424-25, 406 N.W.2d at 387.
89. Id. at 429, 406 N.W.2d at 389.
90. Id. at 430-31, 406 N.W.2d at 390.
While it did not so state, the court may have felt compelled by its previous confrontation clause
analysis to require the statement to satisfy the selfish treatment interest rationale. See infra note 120.
91. Nelson, 138 Wis. at 432, 406 N.W.2d at 390.
92. Id. at 432, 406 N.W.2d at 391.
Other courts have reached very different conclusions when addressing the issue of whether a
child recognizes the significance of similar statements. The Colorado courts have placed an eviden-
tiary burden on the prosecution as the proponent of the evidence to establish the foundation for
admission-that the child, in spite of her testimonial incompetence, appreciates the need to provide
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In dealing with the admission of the statements of identification, the court,
without acknowledgment, changed its focus from the subjective appreciation of
the child to the basis-of-the-expert's-opinion rationale. It concentrated exclu-
sively upon the psychologist's need to know the identity of the perpetrator for
effective treatment, and on that basis found the statements admissible.
93
The court then examined the defendant's argument that because the psy-
chologist had rendered no opinion, the statements were not admissible. The
court rejected this argument on the basis that it applied when the statement was
offered solely for the purpose of the expert testifying at trial and did not apply in
the case at hand because of the presence of the child's selfish treatment
interest.
94
1. Requirement that the Expert Testify and Be Permitted to Give an
Opinion as to Which the Statement Formed a Basis
A major justification for extending the exception for statements for medical
treatment to statements received for diagnostic purposes alone is that such state-
ments would be received in any case for the limited purpose of forming the basis
for the expert's opinion. The distinction between admissibility as a hearsay ex-
ception and for such a limited purpose was believed to be largely lost on a lay
jury, and therefore the distinction was determined to be a needless formalism.
Yet, if the expert is not permitted to give the opinion to which the statement is
relevant, and the statement is not made out of the patient's selfish interest in
receiving appropriate treatment because none is anticipated, both the needless
formalism argument and the independent basis for trustworthiness disappear.
Accordingly, admission of the statement under these circumstances is extraordi-
narily problematic.
In the typical personal injury case that provided the impetus for this expan-
sion of the exception, 95 the doctor would generally testify in court to an admissi-
ble diagnosis. The injured person's statement to the doctor, which under the
explicit requirement of the exception had to be pertinent to the diagnosis, would
be admitted as a basis of the opinion. Therefore treating the statement made to
accurate information for medical diagnosis or treatment purposes. Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132,
1135 & n.7 (Colo. 1986); W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 181 (Colo. 1984); People ex reL W.C.L.,
650 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). In State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199, 735 P.2d 801,
809 (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that young children do not always grasp the
relationship between their statements and treatment. As a result, it did not assert as a matter of faith
that the child perceived the significance of the statements to her treatment but instead found the
rationale that the statements were relied on by the medical expert to be critical to admissibility. Id.
Cf. State v. D.R., 214 N.J. Super. 278, 288-90, 518 A.2d 1122, 1127-28 (1986) (child's inexperience
with sexual matters removes the "stress of nervous excitement" and therefore spontaneous utterance
exception inapplicable), rev'd on other grounds, 109 N.J. 348, 537 A.2d 667 (1988).
93. 138 Wis. 2d at 434, 406 N.W.2d at 391.
94. Id. at 435, 406 N.W.2d at 392 (citing Klingman v. Kruschke, 115 Wis. 2d 124, 126, 339
N.W.2d 603, 604 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)).
95. See, e.g., Uberto v. Kaufman, 348 Mass. 171, 172-73, 202 N.E.2d 822, 823 (1964) (expert,
who gave opinion that heart attack caused by lifting heavy bundles, could recite hearsay statements
relied upon by him in reaching that conclusion).
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the doctor as a hearsay exception had relatively little substantive impact on the
trial of cases and no impact on the testimony actually heard by the jury.
By contrast, the child sexual abuse cases, particularly those cases involving
statements of identity, often do not include circumstances similar to those giving
rise to expansion of rule 803(4). An expert who diagnoses the child's psycholog-
ical problems may discuss the incident and receive statements identifying the
perpetrator. These statements may arguably be relevant to a "treatment" for the
condition-the removal of the child from the presence of the perpetrator if he is
a family member or friend who had access to the child. 96 However, the expert
will typically not be permitted as part of her testimony to express the opinion
that the child was sexually assaulted by a given individual or that removal of the
child from the presence of that individual is appropriate treatment. 97 Neverthe-
less, under the hearsay exception, experts are permitted in cases such as Nelson
to testify to the statements made by the child.
Under these circumstances, viewing the exception as having two distinct
supporting rationales has an important impact which the court in Nelson en-
tirely ignored. The basis-of-the-expert's-opinion rationale provides little justifi-
cation for admitting statements going to identity when the expert may not give
an opinion as to which statements of identity are relevant. The only valid justifi-
96. Courts have recognized, in addition to a treatment purpose, a legal duty of the expert to
prevent the reoccurrence of the incident. See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 & n.13
(8th Cir. 1985); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 725-27 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253
(1984). While that clearly is a duty the expert may be bound to follow, it does not make the state-
ment pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Instead, it makes the statement relevant to the perform-
ance of a legal duty by the auditor of a hearsay statement, not the basis of any generally recognized
hearsay exception. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 46-47, 536 A.2d 666, 688-89, cert. denied,
312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988).
97. Courts in a number of states permit an expert to testify that a child has been sexually
abused or has had sexual intercourse. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1988)
(expert testimony concluding that child abuse properly admitted); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705,
708 (Nev. 1987) (proper for expert to give an opinion that child had been sexually abused where
opinion within the expertise of witness and where probative value outweighed prejudice); State v.
Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655-56 (1988) (expert may testify that child had been
sexually abused, which does not violate rule against giving opinion on credibility of witness or con-
cerning guilt of defendant). See McCord, supra note 3, at 12-17. The expert, however, is not permit-
ted to give an opinion that the child was abused or had intercourse with a particular individual for a
variety of reasons, including that such opinions are excessively prejudicial or not within the expertise
of the particular expert. See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 34-35 (1988); Townsend v.
State, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (Nev. 1987); State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 460, 358 S.E.2d 679, 683
(1987); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985); see also Note, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U.L. REv. 155, 190-91 (1988) (arguing that
expert testimony should be admitted in child sexual abuse cases where relevant in virtually all cir-
cumstances except to identify the defendant as the perpetrator).
In those states where an opinion may be given that sexual abuse occurred, the statement of the
child as to who committed the act in some situations may be relevant to the admissible opinion. In
those situations, the statement of identification may be disclosed as a basis of the expert's opinion.
.The mere fact that a statement forms the basis of an expert's opinion does not mean that it is auto-
matically admissible. Such a statement, like the opinion that a particular individual committed the
act, may be excluded under rule 403. See People v. Coleman, 38 Cal. 3d 69, 92, 695 P.2d 189, 203,
211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 116 (1985) (typically an expert may give his reasons for his opinion on direct
examination and ordinarily a limiting instruction that the statements relied upon are not admitted
for the truth cures any hearsay problem, but these procedures are not adequate where inadmissible
evidence is recited in detail and where it is highly prejudicial); M. GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 703.1,
at 631 & n.27; Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduc-
tion of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234, 251 (1984).
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cation for receiving such statements would be that they are relevant to the pur-
pose of securing medical or perhaps psychological treatment as perceived by the
declarant. In Nelson the court, while asserting that the child's selfish treatment
interest operated in general as to the consultations, abandoned that focus when
dealing with the statements of identification. As to the child's identification of
defendant as the perpetrator, the court found no selfish interest and the expert
offered no opinion. Accordingly, the statements of identification should not
have been received.
In summary, the expansion of the exception that appropriately operates in
civil cases involving personal injury does not warrant receiving statements of
identity in criminal cases of child sexual abuse. The statements should be receiv-
able, as they would have been under common law formulations, only if they are
relevant to the perceived selfish interest of the declarant to receive treatment.
98
2. Limitations on Rule 803(4) Based on Psychological Subject Matter and
Nature of Auditor's Expertise
Neither of the exception's trustworthiness rationales provides particularly
strong support where the subject of a statement offered under rule 803(4) con-
cerns psychological aliments or, more narrowly, statements of identification. It
is far from clear that child victims of sexual assault, particularly very young
declarants, recognize a selfish interest related to treatment in speaking accu-
rately about psychological concerns.99 The weakness of the child's subjective
appreciation of the impact of the statement upon his health is especially clear
when compared to the degree of selfish interest found in the typical case of an
adult speaking to a treating doctor about an existing physical condition that
prompted the patient to seek such treatment. Statements concerning the iden-
tity of the person who committed the assault raise similar issues-indeed often
even more substantial ones-concerning the existence of any perceived treat-
ment interest by the declarant.10°
98. The exception might be extended in appropriate cases to statements of identity that are
closely related to statements made for the purpose of receiving medical treatment even if the identi-
fying statement itself cannot be shown to be within the selfish interest rationale. The statements as a
whole, however, should be shown with clarity to be motivated by a selfish treatment interest rather
than a court simply asserting its general, result-oriented judgment to that effect. See supra note 83.
Such an analysis would often prohibit a result like that in State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337
S.E.2d 833 (1985) in which a statement of identification made by a child to her grandmother was
admitted. A small child's statements to a close relative concerning an injury is likely, but not un-
questionably, motivated by a selfish treatment interest. When the child's statement concerns the
identity of the attacker, however, the motivation is almost certainly not based on a selfish treatment
interest. As a result, even if combined with other statements more likely related to treatment, identi-
fication statements to laymen should still be excluded because the statements as a whole would lack
sufficient trustworthiness guarantees. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
99. The court in Nelson avoided this difficulty by accepting the child's selfish interest a matter
of faith. See supra text accompanying note 92. As noted above, other courts have reached very
different conclusions when faced with the same general issue in the absence of a specific factual
showing that the child appreciated the significance of her statements to proper treatment. See supra
note 92.
100. An apparently reasonable response to these points is that children, particularly young chil-
dren, do not lie to authority figures concerning important matters. This may be an excellent argu-
ment for creating a general exception for statements by young children to authority figures, but it
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Under the rationale that admits a statement forming a basis for the expert's
opinion, several factors simultaneously operate to undermine the statement's
trustworthiness when that opinion concerns an issue of psychological, as op-
posed to physical, well being. First, professionals from a number of fields typi-
cally provide psychological treatment,10 1 and the quality of their credentials and
proves far too much to sustain a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See Cassidy v.
State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988). There the
court rebuffed the state's argument that a two-year-old child was too young to fabricate and there-
fore her statements were reliable. In the court's view, while this might be a basis for admission
under a "tender years" exception to the hearsay rule, it was inconsistent with the selfish treatment
interest rationale. Id. at 30-32, 536 A.2d at 680-81; see also State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 601-02,
350 S.E.2d 76, 83 (1986) (Billings, CJ., dissenting) (where no showing that child has heightened
interest in truthfulness to facilitate treatment, general belief that young children are truthful would
support legislative creation of tender years exception but not admission under rule 803(4)); State v.
Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418,448, 406 N.W.2d 385, 397 (1987) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) ("The asser-
tion that the interrogator was an authority figure is irrelevant to the rationale of the exception.
There is no hearsay exception for statements made to authority figures.").
On the other hand, the fact that a statement is not made with a perception that it will serve the
child's selfish treatment interest does not mean it is unreliable and therefore necessarily inadmissible.
Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1135 n.4 (Colo. 1986) (statements admitted under catchall excep-
tion even though excluded under rule 803(4)). It does mean, however, that the statement should not
be admitted under rule 803(4).
101. Many courts have found statements to persons who are not medical doctors admissible
under rule 803(4). Their analysis is generally not very clear and often takes no note of the two
distinct rationales supporting the exception. For instance, in United States v. Welch, 25 M.J. 23, 25
(C.M.A. 1987), the court held that statements made to a clinical psychologist and senior psychother-
apist were admissible. It first noted that the military rule and its federal rule counterpart contain no
language limiting applicability to medically licensed doctors. Id. The court argued that the com-
mentary explicitly envisioned that statements need not be made to physicians. Id. It then cited a
number of cases admitting statements to psychologists. Id. (citing United States v. DeNoyer, 811
F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987); Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1986); People v. Skinner, 153 Mich.
App. 815, 396 N.W.2d 548 (1986); In re Helms, 77 N.C. App. 617, 335 S.E.2d 917 (1985)). The
court at no point noted that the cited reference in the rule's commentary related only to statements
made under the victim's selfish treatment interest rationale. See also Department of Social Servs. v.
Freiburger, 153 Mich. App. 251, 257, 395 N.W.2d 300, 302 (1986) (statement to psychiatric social
worker admitted under similar argument).
In State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 n.9, 735 P.2d 801, 809 n.9 (1987), the court undertook
some limited analysis to support receiving the statement of a clinical psychologist under the excep-
tion. It noted that a certified psychologist is authorized under state law "to 'diagnose, treat and
correct human conditions ordinarily with the scope of the practice of a psychologist,'" and con-
cluded that the psychologist was treating the patient for a "medical" purpose as required by the rule.
Id. (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT. § 32-2084 (1986)).
In State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 591-93, 367 S.E.2d 139, 144-45 (1988), the court approved
admission of statements by the child victim to a social worker with the Duke Child Protection Team
under this exception, characterizing the exception as applying to "[s]tatements made to a medical
worker." See also United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (statements to social
workers admissible).
By contrast, Weinstein and Berger in their treatise take a very conservative approach: "State-
ments made to a psychiatrist or to someone like a psychologist, who would relay them to a medical
doctor, fall within rule 803(4) .... " 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 803(4)[01], at
150 (emphasis added). Perhaps this conservative approach is related to the authors' appreciation of
the tremendous range of relevant statements in such fields: "As a general rule all statements made in
this context, regardless of their content, are relevant to diagnosis or treatment since experts in the
field view everything relating to the patient as relevant to his personality." Id. (citing United States
v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see also Graham, supra note 3, at 529, n.26 (asserting that
the exception should not extend to statements made to social workers); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.
App. 1, 47-48, 536 A.2d 666, 688-89 (1987) (finding no justification for limiting the exception to
medical personnel and excluding highly trained specialists from other disciplines if declarant's selfish
treatment interest is not involved and medical workers are permitted to testify to statements received
for purposes of social disposition), cerL denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988).
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expertise is neither consistent nor necessarily excellent. Second, the breadth of
the information considered relevant to the treatment of a psychological malady
is expansive.' 0 2 The combination of these two factors means that, as a group,
statements relied upon by these experts should be received only after particular-
ized inquiry into the trustworthiness of the statements, especially since state-
ments of all other experts are received only for a limited purpose.
Moreover, courts have expanded the subject matter of the opinions that
may form the predicate for admission of the hearsay statements. The decided
cases impose no explicit requirement that the expert's opinion be limited to a
matter relevant to treatment of a psychological malady.10 3 Under the theory of
the exception, the statement should be relevant to an opinion related to possible
treatment of the declarant, although treatment need not be intended or in fact
result. Simply because the expert is one who typically gives opinions related to
psychological condition and because the expert is competent to form an opinion
relevant to some aspect of the case should not be sufficient reason to receive the
statement. 104
At this point, the anomalous nature of the exclusion of statements to all
other experts when offered for their truth becomes painfully obvious. When the
exception is extended to include statements that provide the basis for opinions
not related to treatment, the exception has lost its general integrity. In order to
provide some meaningful assurance of actual trustworthiness, the exception
should be construed to require a special level or type of expertise for the auditor
of the statement or to limit the subject matter of the expert opinion.' 0 5
102. See supra notes 10 & 96.
103. See State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 15-17, 354 S.E.2d 527, 535-36, disc. rev. denied, 320
N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987). The court in Oliver contended that an expert's determinations
whether a child could distinguish between fact and fantasy and whether a child could have easily
been coached into alleging sexual assault were relevant to treatment of her psychological condition.
Id. at 15-16, 354 S.E.2d at 536. That claim, however, seems either farfetched or to suggest such a
flexible standard as to cover virtually any opinion that a psychologist might render concerning the
child.
104. Generally the expert may give an opinion that the complaining witness exhibits symptoms
consistent with sexually abused children that may help explain to the jury aspects of the child's
behavior that otherwise would appear to undermine the credibility of the accusation. McCord, supra
note 3, at 58-60; see State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Me. 1988) (given attack on credibility by
defense questioning victim's actions following incident, testimony of expert concerning usual pattern
of child's behavior in sexual abuse cases admissible); People v. Beckley, 161 Mich. App. 120, 409
N.W.2d 759 (1987) (same), review granted, 430 Mich. 857, 420 N.W.2d 827 (1988); State v. Ken-
nedy, 320 N.C. 20, 31-32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366-67 (1987) (same); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212,
217-19, 365 S.E.2d 651, 654-55 (1988) (same).
The fact that a doctor, psychologist, or social worker can give such testimony as an expert,
however, should not mean that statements received by the expert are admissible under this hearsay
exception. The language of the rule, which requires that such statements be "reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment" should be read to mean that as far as subject matter is concerned, the opin-
ion must be relevant to a treatment-type issue, even though under the rule no treatment need actu-
ally be anticipated. Medical treatment is reintroduced here into the requirements of the rule, not as
a limitation that would exclude testimony by a doctor who is expected only to provide trial testi-
mony, but as a restriction on the appropriate subject of expert testimony since, unlike other expert
testimony, the statements made for medical purposes are substantively admissible. Cf State v.
Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 343, 341 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1986) (mental health professional's testimony con-
cerning child's truthfulness irrelevant to mental state or health of child).
105. Professor Graham argues that, since almost anything is relevant to diagnosis or treatment
of psychological well being, too many untrustworthy statements would be admissible under an un-
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Strict limitations on the type of expert involved appear less warranted as a
general matter than tight restrictions on subject matter of the permissible opin-
ions to which the statements may relate. The identity of the expert, however,
should be a factor in determining whether to admit the statement in some cases.
Perhaps all statements to social workers should not be excluded from the excep-
tion.10 6 On the other hand, a statement made to a social worker should not be
admitted simply because it is relevant to some opinion the social worker is com-
petent to render concerning a psychological condition.
10 7
If a selfish treatment interest is indeed required to sustain admissibility-
whether under the confrontation clause or under the hearsay rule when the
statement pertains to esoteric psychological or identification issues-courts
should not simply invent such an interest from the facts and circumstances of
the case, as appears to be the tendency of some courts in this highly charged
area.108 Particularly in the criminal context, where the confrontation clause
restricted application of rule 803(4). He advocates limiting the rule to statements pertinent to physi-
cal medical diagnosis or treatment, and would admit other statements having adequate indicia of
trustworthiness under either the residual exceptions or special exceptions created for application in
child sexual abuse cases. Graham, supra note 3, at 529 n.26.
106. Exclusion of statements to social workers'is entirely inappropriate where the patient's self-
ish treatment interest is present. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. This means that
where an examination is performed for the purpose of treatment and that purpose is communicated
to the child, there is no reason to draw distinctions between doctors, psychologists, and social work-
ers. The child is not likely to be able to distinguish between these professionals. Recognizing that
the child is not likely to note these differences between professionals does not render the distinctions
between experts without significance. If the declarant does not perceive that the examination as a
whole or a specific subject, such as the identity of the perpetrator, implicates her selfish treatment
interest, then the statements must be admitted under the basis-of-the-expert's-opinion rationale, and
under this rationale, the expert's qualifications should be an important factor.
Even if excluded from rule 803(4), statements to social workers might be admissible in appro-
priate circumstances under the residual exception, and in such cases, attention would be directly
paid to the types of factors that support the trustworthiness of the statement. See State v. Sorenson,
143 Wis. 2d 226, 242-51, 421 N.W.2d 77, 83-87 (1988).
107. In Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965
(1988), the court strongly criticized and rejected the expansion of the exception beyond treatment of
physical condition to psychiatric counseling and what it termed "realms of social disposition." Once
the treatment of physical injuries is left behind, the reason for the exception-the patient's fear that
unless she supplies accurate information she will not receive proper treatment for injury or disease--
is greatly diminished. Id. at 34, 536 A.2d at 682-83. Then when the purpose moves to recommenda-
tions of social disposition, such as removal of the child from the perpetrator's home, the integrity of
an exception restricted to medical personnel, and in turn the rationality of the exception, ceases to
exist altogether. Highly trained specialists in all sorts of fields have a legal duty to prevent continued
child abuse, but statements made to them are not substantively admissible. The court concluded
that the hearsay exception could not logically be limited to medical personnel if statements for the
purpose of social disposition were included within the exception. Id. at 47-48, 536 A.2d at 688-89.
The issues discussed above are not of major concern when statements concern solely physical
maladies. When such statements are received under the selfish treatment interest, only statements to
physicians or persons who received statements for the purpose of transmitting them to physicians
would satisfy the exception. As to either, the declarant's selfish treatment interest provides the guar-
antee of trustworthiness regardless of the auditor's expertise. When admissibility of a statement is
based on its use by a medical expert to form an opinion and the statement concerns the declarant's
physical condition, only physicians would be qualified to render such opinions. Here the high degree
of professional competence enjoyed by doctors gives a real measure of assurance to the trustworthi-
ness of the statements.
108. Nelson appears to be a case where the selfish treatment interest was improperly "invented."
See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson decision). In Nelson the court
concluded, without any specific factual basis in the record to support its result, that
[Vol. 67
HEARSAY EXCEPTION
makes the patient's subjective interest a critical factor in rendering such state-
ments admissible, courts should require a concrete indication that the declarant
subjectively appreciates that the statement has potential treatment
consequences.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE IN CRIMINAL CASES ON STATEMENTS
UNDER RULE 803(4)
In addition to the limitations on the application of the rule discussed in the
preceding section, the confrontation clause should have an important impact on
the operation of rule 803(4) in some criminal cases. In cases where the child
does not testify,10 9 the confrontation clause should result in exclusion of testi-
Just as a child of three or four years of age understands that statements made to a physi-
cian will be used by that physician to ease the physical pain of the child, we conclude that
such a child also understands that statements made to a psychologist will be used by the
psychologist to ease the emotional or psychological injuries of the child.
138 Wis. 2d at 432, 406 N.W.2d at 391. One is hard pressed to find any basis for the court's asser-
tion. Indeed, because much of the information was elicited by simulating play, the child's conscious-
ness of a treatment purpose appears unlikely. See id. at 447-48, 406 N.W.2d at 397 (Heffernan, C.J.,
dissenting).
109. Whether the declarant must be unavailable before hearsay statements under rule 803(4) are
admissible is presently an open issue. The answer depends largely upon how broadly the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), is construed. Read broadly, Inadi
eliminates the necessity of producing the declarant for all hearsay exceptions under rule 803.
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme Court articulated what appeared to be a
general requirement of unavailability under the confrontation clause before hearsay statements could
be admitted. It stated, "In the usual case,... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Id. at
65. The Court in Inadi stated that the Roberts requirement of unavailability applied only to hearsay
in the form of prior testimony, which the court found to be merely a weaker substitute for live
testimony. Inadi, at 392-94. It held that the government need not show unavailability before intro-
ducing coconspirator statements. Id. at 400.
The Inadi Court stated that coconspirator statements were superior to live testimony. Id. at
395. First, because such statements are made during the conspiracy, their context cannot be repli-
cated. Id. While the court did not put it in these terms, it was treating the statements much like
verbal acts. Second, because of changes in the legal interest between the coconspirators and the
context, any in-court version of the statements is not likely to recapture fully the significance of the
contemporaneous conspiratorial statement. Id.
At least part of the Court's logic applies generally to exceptions under rule 803, since, like the
statements of coconspirators at issue in Inadi, they have independent justifications for admission that
make such hearsay statements theoretically superior to the available in-court testimony of the wit-
ness. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("The present rule proceeds upon the theory
that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though
he may be available."). Indeed, some lower court cases have begun to apply the Inadi analysis to
other circumstances. See, eg., Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1986) (court em-
ployed Inadi analysis to excuse failure of state to call available chemists who performed some tests
reported by expert who did testify), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1903 (1987); United States v. Quick, 22
M.J. 722 (A.C.M.R. 1986) (Inadi principles apply in sexual abuse cases), aff'd, 26 M.J. 460 (C.M.A.
1988); Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 643-44, 732 S.W.2d 817, 822-23 (1987) (Inadi applicable to
statements by youthful sex offense victim under special hearsay exception); People v. Hughey, 194
Cal. App. 3d 1383, 1392-93, 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 275 (1987) (Inadi applies to spontaneous utterance
exception). But see State v. Kerley, 87 N.C. App. 240, 245, 360 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1987) (without
citing Inadi, court finds unavailability showing required for excited utterance), disc. review denied,
321 N.C. 476, 364 S.E.2d 661 (1988); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 320-21, 323 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (statute which placed onus on defendant to call available child victim violates both the defend-
ant's confrontation and due process rights by altering the fairness of the trial in requiring defendant
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mony which would otherwise be admissible exclusively under the basis-of-the-
expert's-opinion rationale.
The confrontation clause presents an obstacle to admitting hearsay state-
ments only when the child does not testify in the state's case either because of
unavailability' 10 or by choice of the prosecution.' Under California v.
to choose between calling the child or foregoing cross-examination), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1301
(1988).
If the question is viewed as simply one of predicting how the Supreme Court will rule on requir-
ing a showing of unavailability under rule 803(4), the answer is quite unclear. When it comes to the
right to confront a witness whose hearsay statement is offered at trial, the Court has recently shown
little interest in reading the right expansively. See United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838, 845 (1988)
(right to confront satisfied as to witness who had lost all memory of underlying event); Boujaily v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987) (no showing of reliability required of coconspirator
statements); Inadi, 475 U.S. 387. On the other hand, the Court has protected what would appear
substantively to be a far less important right of the defendant to "stare down" a witness, ruling
unconstitutional on confrontation grounds a state procedure to screen the victim from viewing the
defendant. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988).
Commentators have suggested tests that would require unavailability before at least some state-
ments under rule 803(4) are admitted. Professor Kirkpatrick has fashioned a test based largely on
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion), which looks to the questions of importance
of the statement, its reliability, its susceptibility to testing by cross-examination, and the adequacy of
alternatives to cross-examination. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the
Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665, 682-86 (1986). He specifically
opines that the exception in rule 803(4) would probably fail his test. Id. at 690 & n.132. Professor
Michael Graham argues that the test for unavailability should be whether the "circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the statement indicate that it was accusatory when made." Graham, supra
note 3, at 593; see Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness,
56 Tax. L. REV. 151, 192 (1978). Under Graham's test, many statements made to experts involved
in the investigation of potential criminal conduct would be admissible only after a showing of un-
availability. Graham, supra note 3, at 585.
It is hard to go much further in this murky area, however, than to note the great uncertainty
and to suggest that, if unavailability remains a requirement for any of the hearsay exceptions under
rule 803, it is likely to be imposed as to statements admitted under the basis-of-the-expert's-opinion
rationale under rule 803(4). Cf. Nelson v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304, 1324-26 (E.D. Wis. 1988)
(testimony of child witnesses may be admissible under nontraditional hearsay exceptions where child
testifies or prosecution unable to produce her).
110. Unavailability typically occurs in child sexual abuse cases as a result of incompetence re-
suting from the child's age and immaturity, see, eg., State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 203-04, 735
P.2d 801, 813-14 (1987) (trial court ruled that complaining witness was incapable of testifying based
on testimony by expert that child would be uncommunicative if asked about the assault and would
be traumatized by testimony and based on review of transcripts of child's previous unsuccessful
efforts to testify); State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 24-25, 697 P.2d 836, 843 (1985) (child incompetent to
testify); State v. Drusch, 139 Wis. 2d 312, 321-22, 407 N.W.2d 328, 332-33 (Wis. Ct. App.) (child,
who was unresponsive and cried while on stand, unavailable), rev. denied, 140 Wis. 2d 874, 416
N.W.2d 66 (1987); cf State v. Kuone, 243 Kan. 218, 757 P.2d 289 (1988) (child unavailable where
court found grave risk that psychological injury would result from testifying); State v. Slider, 38
Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (child with no memory of event at time of trial unavailable).
111. Some states have chosen as a legislative judgment to spare the child the trauma of testi-
mony, admitting the child's pretrial statement and placing the onus on the defense to call her. See,
e.g., Johnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark. 1987) (Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25) establishes
"tender years" exception that permits hearsay statements of child to be admitted even if child is
available). Cf. State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 442-43, 406 N.W.2d 385, 395 (1987) (court weighed
social interest in protecting the child, finding unavailability where expert testified that testimony
would "exact considerable toll on [child's] well-being" and where court itself questioned efficacy of
cross-examination), habeas corpus relief granted, Nelson v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304, 1318-20 (E.D.
Wis. 1988) (district court found testimony concerning duration and severity of likely trauma insuffi-
cient to constitute unavailability).
Under the confrontation clause, a generalized legislative judgment that trauma will result from
the child testifying is unlikely to be sufficient to satisfy an unavailability requirement. In Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988), the Court held unconstitutional under the confrontation clause a state
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Green, 12 when the witness is available to be cross-examined at trial concerning
her prior statements, the confrontation clause is not violated by use of such prior
statements. And under the recent decision in United States v. Owens,113 even the
failure of the witness to remember the details of the statement would not violate
the right. 114 If the child does not testify, however, the confrontation issue
presented is both very substantial and difficult. The most serious of these issues
arises in trials in which, without cross-examination, the hearsay exception is
used as the exclusive vehicle for presenting the child's accusations against the
defendant to the jury." 5
procedure which screened the child from seeing the defendant. The protective device was authorized
on the basis of a general legislative judgment that complaining witnesses in child abuse cases should
be protected. The Court found the procedure unconstitutional, reasoning that the right of face to
face confrontation, explicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment, could certainly not be denied
where no individualized findings had been made that the witness needed special protection. See also
Graham, supra note 3, at 558-62 (discussing adequacy of psychological injury to show
unavailability).
112. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
113. 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988).
114. Id. at 842-43. In Owens the Court noted that the confrontation clause guaraiteed only an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, and concluded that such opportunity is not denied when
either (1) the witness testifies to his current belief but is unable to recollect the reason for the belief or
(2) his belief is introduced through a hearsay statement and the witness testifies that he is unable to
recollect the reason for that past belief. Id. at 842. In Owens the witness' hearsay statement was
significant because it identified the defendant as the person who committed the crime. The Court
stated:
It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the
witness's bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often
a prime objective of cross-examination, see 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 995, at pp. 931-32
(J. Chadbourn rev. 1970)) the very fact that he has a bad memory.
Id.
Owens clearly eliminates the confrontation clause issue in a case like State v. Stafford, 317 N.C.
568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986). In Stafford the complaining witness, who was 13 years old, testified in
the state's case and was subject to cross-examination. Id. at 575, 346 S.E.2d at 468. While the
statement was not admissible as a prior consistent statement because it "went far beyond" the in-
court testimony, id., such differences do not implicate the confrontation clause.
The situation in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981), presents a closer issue, but like Stafford appears to raise no confrontation issue under
Owens. There the nine-year-old complaining witness testified and was subject to cross-examination
but was unable to repeat the statement she had previously made. She was, however, able to provide
facts supporting her prior statements. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 87.
Owens, however, should not mean that simply putting a child on the stand, regardless of his
mental maturity, is sufficient to eliminate the confrontation clause concern. It should have no im-
pact on a case like United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979), where the victim was three,
and while he was not formally ruled incompetent, the court concluded he could not have been
subject to cross-examination because of his extremely young age. Id. at 1202. While less clear,
Owens should not alter the analysis in United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446 (8th Cir. 1986),
in which the court described the five-year-old victim, called to testify by the prosecution, as "simply
too young and too frightened to be subjected to a thorough direct or cross-examination." The
Supreme Court in Owens, while indicating that a full cross-examination was not required by the
confrontation clause, did indicate that it remained concerned that defense counsel not be deprived of
all opportunity to demonstrate the weakness of the testimony. 108 S. Ct. at 842-43. That such
opportunity is possible with a witness who is as described in Dorian is doubtful. Finally, Owens
should certainly not render available for purposes of the sixth amendment a child who, under mod-
em standards of competency takes the stand but is ruled unavailable as incompetent due to extreme
mental immaturity or inability to answer questions caused by trauma.
115. See Graham, supra note 3, at 585 (arguing that statements made in preparation for litiga-
tion are unlikely to possess sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy confrontation clause requirements
under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). Cf. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1
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Assuming the child does not testify, the issue under the confrontation
clause is under what circumstances will a hearsay statement possess adequate
"indicia of reliability" to serve as a substitute for the opportunity to confront the
declarant and thereby satisfy the demands of the confrontation clause. In Ohio
v. Roberts116 the United States Supreme Court stated that such reliability "can
be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
1 1 7
The Court provided no precise definition of what hearsay exceptions are
"firmly rooted." The Court observed that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon
such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "118 It also cited
cross-examined prior testimony and properly administered business and public
records exceptions as examples of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.1 19 The
Court, however, set out no clear guidelines for determining when an exception
falls within the "firmly rooted" category.
Some courts and commentators have argued that the appropriate way to
determine which exceptions are "firmly rooted," given the function of this con-
cept under confrontation clause analysis, is to examine the reliability of the ex-
ception. 120 In Bouraily v. United States, 121 however, the Supreme Court
adopted a different test in holding that the coconspirator exception1 22 is "firmly
rooted" within the meaning of Roberts and concluding that no independent in-
quiry into the reliability of the statement was required. The Court reached this
803(4)[01], at 147 (arguing that, where statement of available witness who does not testify is pro-
duced through rule 803(4) and contains critical fact, court may find evidence insufficient to support
verdict).
It is somewhat ironic that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which has
led the way in expanding the application of rule 803(4) in child sexual abuse cases, decided an often-
cited case decrying the denial of the right to effective cross-examination if the declarant's statement
could be produced exclusively through the testimony of an expert who was consulted only for the
purpose of testifying. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Quinley, 87 F.2d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1937).
116. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
117. Id. at 66.
118. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
119. Id. at 66 n.8.
120. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 709-10, 370 N.W.2d 745, 759 (1985); Goldman, Not So
"Finnly Rooted". Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1987).
In Wyss the court specifically addressed whether Wisconsin's rule covering statements for medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment, Wis. R. EVID. 908.03(4), was "firmly rooted" insofar as it admitted
statements of the cause or external source of the symptoms described by the declarant. 124 Wis. 2d
at 709-10, 370 N.W.2d at 758-59. The court acknowledged that admitting statements of cause con-
stituted a change in state law and therefore would not satisfy a "firmly rooted" requirement based on
longevity. Id. It concluded, however, that longevity was not the test, but rather considerations of
reliability and trustworthiness, which were satisfied because under the theory of the exception such
statements are motivated by the declarant's interest in proper treatment. Id.
121. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
122. Although this Article uses the term "coconspirator exception" throughout, "coconspirator
exclusion" would be a somewhat more accurate term. Coconspirator statements are excluded from
the definition of hearsay under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), and because they are not hearsay, they
need not be admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. Due to the awkwardness of the term




conclusion, not on the basis of an assessment of the reliability of the cocon-
spirator exception, 123 but because of the long-standing acceptance of the excep-
tion. The Court observed that the exception was first explicitly adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1827, it had been repeatedly reaffirmed as accepted practice,
and, to the extent not superseded by the Federal Rules, it was demonstrably part
of our jurisprudence. 124 Recently in Coy v. Iowa,125 the Court again emphasized
the longevity point. In holding constitutionally invalid a state practice of screen-
ing young victims from viewing the defendant, the Court stated that "[t]he ex-
ception created by the Iowa statute, which was passed in 1985, could hardly be
viewed as firmly rooted."
126
Even under the analysis of Bourlaily and certainly under a trustworthiness
analysis, statements admissible only under the newly added rationale that admits
statements forming a basis of the medical expert's opinion should not be found
within the "firmly rooted" category. First, the Court in Bourlaily parentheti-
cally explained its holding in Dutton v. Evans 127 as requiring a reliability analy-
sis when the state evidentiary rule expanded the common-law approach by
admitting coconspirators' hearsay statements made after termination of
conspiracy. 128
Furthermore, in Bourlaily it found the coconspirator exception under the
federal rule "firmly rooted," placing similarly strong emphasis on the lack of
deviation from the long-standing common law definition. The petitioner had
argued that the change in the substantive dimension of the hearsay exception,
approved in Bourlaily, that allowed a court to consider the putative cocon-
spirator statement in determining whether a conspiracy existed 129 meant that
the exception could no longer be considered "firmly rooted." The Court re-
jected the argument. It concluded that only the method of proving that a state-
ment falls within the exception had been changed, not the dimensions of the
exception, "which has remained substantively unchanged since its adoption in
this country."
130
123. Unlike statements admitted under traditional hearsay exceptions, the theory for admission
of coconspirator statements is not based on the trustworthiness or reliability of the statements but
instead on a characteristic of the adversary system. See Bounaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2785-87 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (setting out authorities and discussing theory of excluding admissions of party oppo-
nent, which includes coconspirator statements, from definition of hearsay). Accordingly, use of a
trustworthiness test would have raised serious difficulties in admitting coconspirator statements.
124. Id. at 2783 (opinion of the Court).
125. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
126. Id. at 2803.
127. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
128. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2783.
129. Id. at 2782 ("[A] court, in making a preliminary factual determination under rule
801(d)(2)(E), may examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted.").
130. Id. at 2783 n.4. Whether the analysis of State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 709-10, 370
N.W.2d 745, 759 (1985) survives the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Boudaily insofar as
it rejects longevity as a central issue in determining that a hearsay exception is "deeply rooted" is
questionable. For a discussion of Wyss, see supra note 120. Regardless, however, of the answer to
that question, Wyss gives no affirmative indication that statements admissible solely under the basis-
of-the-expert's-opinion rationale constitute a "firmly rooted" exception. Indeed, since Wyss relied on
the fact that statements of cause are considered reliable and trustworthy because they are within the
declarant's selfish interest in proper treatment, 124 Wis. 2d at 709-10, 370 N.W.2d at 758-59, the
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The new rationale admitting statements made for medical diagnosis when
no treatment is anticipated by the declarant admittedly has a firmer place in our
jurisprudence than the exception created by the Iowa statute in Coy. On bal-
ance, however, admitting statements solely under this rationale more closely re-
sembles the facts in Dutton than those in Bourjaily. In Dutton, as here, the State
of Georgia had expanded the boundaries of the coconspirator exception to admit
statements, which under the theory of the exception should be generally of a less
trustworthy character than under the traditional common law formulation. The
expansion of the instant hearsay exception to include statements that lack any
selfish treatment interest is closely analogous. Accordingly, under the confron-
tation clause, statements falling within the new rationale of rule 803(4) must be
shown to have "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
In summary, under the above analysis of the confrontation clause, when a
statement is offered as substantive evidence exclusively on the basis that a medi-
cal expert has relied upon it to form her opinion, the statement is not within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. If not "firmly rooted," statements under this
rationale do not automatically as a class possess the necessary "indicia of relia-
bility," and the government must demonstrate that the statement in question has
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 131 While some statements
under this second rationale will satisfy the required showing, others clearly will
not. 132
case supports the position that statements admitted only as the basis of a medical expert's opinion
are not within the "firmly rooted" category.
131. Different tests have been used by the courts for determining when an exception has suffi-
cient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause. Some
cases look to Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) as a model. Dutton identified four factors as
important: (1) the statement contained no express assertion of past fact; (2) the declarant's personal
knowledge was clearly established; (3) there was virtually no possibility that the statement was based
on faulty recollection; and (4) the circumstances under which the statement was made supported the
conclusion that the declarant did not have reason to misrepresent the facts. Id. at 88-89; see United
States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1984). Other courts have found the appropriate
issue to be whether, under the language of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970), the circum-
stances "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."
E.g. United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1288
(1987); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
Yet others have used a test that replicates the evidentiary analysis of trustworthiness employed in
assessing admissibility under the catchall hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Dorian, 803
F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 204, 735 P.2d 801, 814 (1987)
(standards similar); State v. MeCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 163 (S.D. 1984) ("The 'indicia of reliabil-
ity' referred to by the Roberts Court and the 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' language
in the residual exception to the hearsay rule are synonymous."); Graham, supra note 3, at 563-64.
Perhaps more significant than differences in the general test, courts have been inconsistent in
requiring a rigorous showing of trustworthiness and particularly so in the emotionally charged area
of child sexual abuse. Compare State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 204-05, 735 P.2d 801, 814-15
(1987) (noting that the need to prosecute child abusers provides no justification for admitting hear-
say statements unless Roberts principles are fully satisfied but finding statements to psychologist
automatically admissible) with United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986) (con-
frontation clause should be applied in pragmatic fashion taking into account the very strong interest
in protecting defenseless child abuse victims).
132. Admissibility should prove problematic if the circumstances indicate that because of age,
maturity, or setting the patient's selfish treatment interest is not involved and the opinion goes to
psychological maladies or statements of identity. Although the court in State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d
418, 406 N.W.2d 385, 396 (1987) (discussed in text accompanying notes 85-94), found that the facts




In the above analysis, this Article argues that the hearsay exception for
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment is not a mono-
lith and should not be treated by the courts as if it required uniform application
regardless of the rationale supporting admission of the specific statement. The
Article contends that the confrontation clause requires the exception to be ap-
plied most restrictively in criminal cases in which the declarant does not testify.
In civil litigation and criminal cases that do not implicate the confrontation
clause because a competent complaining witness testifies in the state's case, the
exception may properly be applied so as to admit statements under both ratio-
nales: the traditional trustworthiness rationale applicable to statements made
for a selfish treatment purpose and the new rationale applicable to statements
relied upon by medical experts to form their opinions. Yet, even in cases that do
not implicate the confrontation clause, the exception should operate within the
limitations developed in this Article.
First, when the statement is admitted exclusively under the rationale that it
forms part of the basis for the expert's opinion, the expert must have in fact
relied upon that statement in reaching an opinion relevant to the medical treat-
ment of the declarant, and should actually testify to that opinion before the
statement is admitted. Second, the application of the exception should be lim-
ited to classes of persons with some formally recognized expertise in a field
closely allied with the medical field. Finally, courts should evaluate the facts
realistically in determining whether the statement should be admitted under the
selfish treatment interest rationale when it concerns matters relevant only to
psychological well being. They should examine the subject matter of the inquiry
and the circumstances of the conversation to determine if the declarant had any
real perception that his health would likely be affected by the information
provided.
The first of the above limitations is based on the principle that unless the
expert actually relies on the statement, the basis for assuming the trustworthi-
ness of the statement is lacking and, unless she is permitted to testify to that
opinion, a major justification for admission of the statement is removed. If the
expert does not in fact rely on the statement to form a medically relevant opin-
ion, there is no reliability guarantee for the statement that would arise from the
competence of the expert who is presumed not to rely on statements that lack
trustworthiness. Furthermore, if she does not testify to that statement in the
context of a relevant opinion, the finder of fact does not have an opportunity to
judge the expert's power to evaluate the statement. Finally, since the jury, but
Nelson case presents an example of the type of fact situation that should result in exclusion of the
testimony under the confrontation clause. Therefore, the federal district court granted habeas
corpus relief, while the state supreme court ruled otherwise. Nelson v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304,
1326-27 (E.D. Wis. 1988). Moreover, since the statements in Nelson were elicited as part of prepara-
tion for litigation, unavailability is also likely to be required under the confrontation clause. See
supra note 109.
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for this extension of the hearsay exception, would never have heard the state-
ment, any concern about the ineffectiveness of a limiting instruction is irrelevant.
The second limitation flows from the need to justify a treatment of state-
ments received by medical experts different from those made to experts in other
fields. If the declarant's subjective interest provides no guarantee of reliability, it
makes little sense to admit a statement made to a social worker in the area of
child abuse when a statement made to a more highly credentialed expert con-
cerning other areas of important social concern would be admitted only for a
limited purpose and only in support of that expert's opinion, if one is admitted at
trial. If statements are to be received in the medical area in the absence of any
selfish treatment interest by the declarant, then the specialized training of the
expert involved must assure the trustworthiness of the statement.
Under the final point, courts should be wary of attributing a selfish treat-
ment interest to statements made concerning psychological concerns and issues
of identity. This is particularly true when the conversation occurs in informal
settings and when the psychological expert is attempting to determine questions
such as the truth-telling ability of the child which only indirectly relates to any
possible treatmient decision.1
33
In criminal cases in which the child is unavailable or is not called by the
state, a different and more substantial pattern of limitations should apply be-
cause of the impact of the confrontation clause when the declarant, due to in-
competence or other reasons, does not testify in the state's case and is not
available for cross-examination. When the declarant does not testify for the
state, the statement should be admitted generally only if it is justified under the
subjective selfish treatment interest rationale. The confrontation clause requires
either that the statement fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or that it
bear special indicia of reliability. Neither is satisfied in the typical case when the
statement is admitted under the expanded theory that the statement forms the
basis of an expert's opinion.
Under the confrontation clause, a statement should be excluded even if it
ostensibly comes within the selfish interest rationale when, in fact, the subject
matter of the statement, the circumstances under which it was made, or the age
or mental maturity of the declarant indicates that the perceived well being of the
declarant is not implicated by the statement. The fact that the statement per-
tains to psychological concerns that bear little relationship to the physical condi-
tion of the declarant or that have no perceptible relationship to any medical
133. Rule 403 should be used by the courts to limit admission of statements that lack any sub-
stantial guarantee of trustworthiness. In Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 1988),
retired Justice Powell (sitting by designation) argued in dissent that while statements made to a
"physician" consulted only for the purpose of testifying at trial are apparently admissible under rule
803(4), statements for this purpose are inherently less reliable than others under the exception. The
professional witness may be less objective when so retained as a testifying expert, and more impor-
tantly, the declarant's veracity may be suspect because the statement serves no treatment purpose.
The trial court could appropriately exercise its discretion in such cases to exclude the statement
under rule 403 on the ground that prejudice outweighs probativity. Cf. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 2, 803(4)[01], at 151 (rule 403 may be used to exclude statements involving exten-
sive details over years of time and those made by mentally impaired declarants).
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concern should be of critical importance and often should have decisive
impact. 
134
In general, efforts to take statements in informal settings designed to put the
child at ease and even to disguise the true purpose of the inquiry may prove
useful information-gathering techniques, but those same techniques may elimi-
nate the subjective concern for proper treatment that undergirds the trustworthi-
ness of the statement. 13 5 Moreover, the age and mental maturity of the child
may attenuate the selfish interest of the declarant so profoundly as to virtually
eliminate any trustworthiness guarantee under the rationale of this exception.
The response that children do not typically lie to authority figures cannot be a
sufficient substitute for medical selfish interest. The argument, if accepted,
would justify admitting statements about any important event in the child's life
to any authority figure, regardless of whether they are made to a medical expert
or concern a treatment issue.
In the end, the analysis presented here will not necessarily mean that large
groups of statements now admitted under rule 803(4) will be excluded alto-
gether. Many of them may be admitted through rule 803(24)136 or through
newly created exceptions specifically crafted to cover statements made by chil-
dren concerning abuse or sexual assault. 137 If this is so, why does it matter what
theory is used for admission?
One important difference is that, if an appropriate theory is used, efforts to
admit such statements will not produce a distortion in the appropriate contours
of the exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment.138 Dis-
134. One might reasonably argue that if the statement falls under the selfish interest rationale,
even if only weakly shown, that the confrontation clause does not require exclusion of the statement.
The constitutional limitation may not cut so finely as to require exclusion since generally statements
motivated by such selfish interest are within a firmly rooted exception.
135. See supra note 30.
136. Some jurisdictions have virtually eliminated use of rule 803(24) if the declarant is available
to testify at trial. These courts adopt the theory that the rule's "necessity" requirement is not satis-
fied, concluding that, given the availability of live testimony, the out-of-court statement is not
"'more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts.'" State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 95, 337 S.E.2d 833, 846
(1985) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803 (24)) (live testimony by the declarant will usually be more proba-
tive than the hearsay statement); see United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1977)
(grand jury testimony of defendant's wife inadmissible because it was not shown to be best available
evidence when witness was at court and never formally asserted she would refuse to testify); S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 844 (4th ed. 1986) (in exam-
ining availability of other evidence, availability of declarant may be important). But cf. United
States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1976) (statement assisted in meeting trustworthiness
requirement where declarant testifies at trial).
Because the catchall exceptions require the court to focus on the same types of reliability factors
which if met will satisfy the confrontation clause, use of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) will help assure
a consistent result in criminal cases under both evidentiary and constitutional analysis. If, however,
the confrontation clause analysis is properly performed, the results should be roughly the same
whether the court uses either the catchall exceptions or rule 803(4). This is true because the con-
frontation clause, like the catchall exceptions, should require an actual showing of trustworthiness
rather than relying on a general presumption under rule 803(4) that will often be erroneous as to
certain classes of statements.
137. See Graham, supra note 3, at 534 n.50 (citing newly enacted statutes in 20 states applicable
in child sexual abuse prosecutions).
138. Cf. State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 23-24, 697 P.2d 836, 842 (1985) (tender years exception
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tortion may occur when the exception is read too broadly in the child sexual
abuse area and then the force of logic permits admission of statements in other
areas in which no alternative theory would have justified admission. 139 Another
type of distortion occurs when courts constrict the appropriate dimensions of
the exception in one area to avoid a perceived improper expansion in another. 140
More importantly, the results should be more accurate if a valid theory is
used. Specifically, under the catchall exceptions, rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
courts admitting statements would squarely face the issue of the trustworthiness
of the statement under the individual circumstances presented, 14 1 presumably
taking into account factors such as the age and mental maturity of the declarant,
the circumstances of the making of the statement, and the purpose for which it
was made. 142 These explicit judgments would permit an analysis more finely
tuned than admitting all statements within the broad dimensions of the excep-
tion under circumstances in which the selfish treatment interest rationale is in
fact inoperative or admitting statements made to a very broad category of ex-
perts concerning an expansive and amorphous subject matter as to which no
general guarantee of trustworthiness exists. More accurate results should be
achieved by applying the correct theory, which focuses on the key variables
rather than trying to tease appropriate results from an exception poorly designed
for the task.
enacted by legislature to avoid pressure on courts to stretch existing hearsay exceptions in effort to
meet child sexual abuse problem).
139. If the true motivating force behind admission of these statements is the general belief by
many courts that children do not lie to adults, see State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 601, 350 S.E.2d
76, 83 (1986) (Billings, C.J., dissenting), then statements by adult victims to psychologists should not
be admitted; such statements nevertheless will meet the literal terms of the exception as it has been
expanded to meet the child sexual abuse concern.
140. Precisely this type of problem may be brewing in North Carolina. The state supreme court,
perhaps in an effort to limit admissibility in criminal cases in which an examination has been con-
ducted for prosecutorial purposes, appears to be in the process of requiring that all statements admit-
ted under this exception must satisfy the selfish treatment interest rationale and perhaps must not
have been elicited exclusively for the purpose of the expert's trial testimony. See State v. Stafford,
317 N.C. 568, 576-77, 346 S.E.2d 463, 468-69 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting).
141. Both catchall and residual exceptions require the court to determine that the statement has
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" to the explicitly defined hearsay excep-
tions as a prerequisite to admissibility. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
142. As noted above, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text, the confrontation clause
properly applied will produce similar results. Use of a more appropriate hearsay exception will,
however, reduce reliance on constitutional principles to decide questions more appropriately dealt
with as part of the trustworthiness analysis of the hearsay exception. It will also avoid pressures to
distort constitutional analysis, which may have lasting consequences, as evidentiary analysis has
frequently been distorted in this highly charged setting.
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